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MIND AS FEELING.¹

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TRADITIONALLY mind is regarded as having characteristics of three fundamental kinds—cognitive, conative and affective—knowing, striving and feeling. This division is understood in two main ways. According to modern idealistic theory, cognition, conation and feeling are complementary *aspects* of all mental process, each implying the others and the three together constituting what we mean by mentality; and this is perhaps the most widespread view of the matter. At the same time we find in contemporary thought as well as in earlier theories the conception of the cognitive, the conative and the affective as different *sets* of mental processes. This is the view implied by Hume, for example, when he says that reason is no motive to action; reason is regarded as purely cognitive and passive, as having no conative or active character, and similarly as having no affective character.

It may be said, in fact, that all the English thinkers of the eighteenth century were in difficulties as to the distinction and relation between reason and the passions—with the possible exception of Shaftesbury, who, recognising affections towards affections as well as affections towards outside things, made possible an account of mind as a system of affections. To Butler, on the other hand (and here his views are similar to those of Socrates and Aristotle), there could not be system unless there was a specially systematising affection, one which informed man as to his nature or showed him how he could live up to it. Now Butler, like his Greek predecessors, is unable to maintain the distinction between reflective principles and passions or to show what these principles are; this comes out in the ambiguous position of benevolence in his

¹ A paper read to the Sydney branch of the Association in April, 1931.

theory, and in his difficulty in distinguishing the operations of conscience and of self-love. He fails, in fact, to show that any of our motives (tendencies to action) are anything but passionate or how the object of a reflective principle could have any relation to the object of a passion—such a relation, in particular, that the two tendencies could conflict. Similarly, Hume cannot consistently uphold the existence of a reason which is not operative (i.e., which is not already among our actions and capable of affecting others), and which has not particular objects that it pursues in preference to other things and therefore passionately.

Berkeley, again, leaves the passions of the mind in a somewhat ambiguous position in his theory. They are, according to his first division, one main class of “ideas”; but he immediately goes on to argue that the mind is something over and above ideas (which it may “have”), that it is something of which we cannot have an idea but can only have a “notion”, since it is essentially active and ideas are passive. But this means that the “ideas” he calls *passions* are no more intimately related to the mind (no more “its”) than any other ideas; or, if he is going to adhere to the view that passions are in some special way mental, he must abandon the doctrine of the mental as an agent, but not an object, of ordinary cognition. The fact that he goes no further into the question of the passions, is a sign of the weakness of his position.

COGNITION.

The above preliminary survey indicates that the upholders of the “aspect” theory have a certain advantage over those who believe in separate processes of cognition, processes of conation and processes of feeling. But in the end, in consideration of criticisms of a realistic character, we find that both these theories have to be rejected.

Modern realism is founded on the contention that knowledge is a relation, i.e., that it holds between two things and so cannot be a part of the “nature” of either. The main realist attack has been directed against the conception of what is *characterised by being known*, or the “idea”. Realism has denied that what we know need be in any way mental or in any way dependent on the mind which knows it (though realists have not perhaps seen clearly enough that the very term “idea” requires to be dispensed with). And it has thus also attacked the doctrine of the absolute idealists that *we are what we know*, that the whole field of which we are aware (“our world”) is equivalent to our consciousness and to our very selves. It has maintained, on the contrary, that what

we know is part of an independently existing order of things, that the existence of a mind is one thing, and the existence of a field of things known by that mind quite another.

But the further implications of realism have not been so clearly grasped by realists in general, viz., that it has equally to reject what is *characterised by knowing*, or "consciousness"; that it has to say that what knows, as well as what is known, must have a character of its own and cannot be defined by its relation to something else. It has also to reject the whole "self-consciousness" theory of the idealists, who, in upholding the rationalist conception of the knowledge relation as belonging to the "nature" of the things related, brought the whole relation (and both terms of it) within the mind and tried to make a special character out of this internal distinction and relation—tried to make it *generate* the system which it characterised. This self-sustaining mind must be denied if we take relations seriously, and the rejection of the view that we are what we know must be accompanied by the rejection of the view that *we know what we are*.

This does not mean that we cannot have knowledge of our minds (apart from the knowledge we can have of other minds); it means that we are not bound to know all that goes on in our minds. This side of the realist position has been most developed by the psycho-analysts and has been neglected by the leading realists themselves. It clearly opens up the field of psychological inquiry, which is narrowed down by the assumption that we always know what we are doing. Unfortunately much of the old cognitionalist psychology still appears in the work of the psycho-analysts, and this is exemplified in the treatment of the *unconscious* (which we should naturally take as the *unknowing*) as consisting of processes of which we are not aware (the *unknown*)—the confusion being concealed in the expression "*unbewusst*". When the necessary distinction is kept clear, we can see that it is possible for a mental process (having a character of its own; having, at least, "mentality", whatever that may turn out to be) *not* to have the relation of knowing or not to have that of being known or not to have either relation. It is evidently the other view that wants proof. And if we reject the notion of "self-consciousness" (as an attempt to turn a relation into a quality), we clearly cannot argue that a mental process, by somehow "*knowing itself*", is bound to be at once conscious (*knowing*) and known.

Rejection of cognitionalism, then, i.e., of the definition of a process by its relation of knowing, carries with it rejection of the theory of the three *types* of psychic process. There can

be no merely cognitive process, no "reason" such as Hume assumes, no "intellect", etc.—just as there can be no sensations, percepts, concepts, or other entities defined by the fact that, or the manner in which, they are known. But it also involves rejection of the three *aspect* theory, because we cannot call a relation an "aspect" in the same sense as a quality, and we are also entitled now to give credence to the evidence which would indicate that some mental processes *do not* know.

CONATION.

So much for cognitionalism. What of conation or striving? Is it more fitted than cognition to be an actual description of mental processes? It seems clear that, on the contrary, striving is also a relation, implying a striver and a striven for. Of course, if we regard conation as simply meaning *activity*, then it is just another word for process, and is not a means of distinguishing minds from any other existing things. Taking conation as striving, however, we find in the first instance that the conational theory of mind—exemplified in Alexander's "Foundations and Sketch Plan of a Conational Psychology"¹ and again in Freud's recognition of the characteristic mental process as a *wish*; suggested, also, in the general position of the pragmatists—certainly marks an advance on the cognitional theory. This is particularly so in respect of the theory of knowledge itself (including the theory of error).

Cognitionalism upholds the doctrine of "ideas", i.e., things characterised by being known, and thus involves us either in the coherence theory of truth or (when certain realist assumptions are implicitly made; when it is assumed that we *somehow* know, beyond "ideas", what they represent) in the correspondence theory. The former theory fails because it, like any other, cannot be consistently unrealistic. If we rightly or wrongly regard a certain idea as cohering with other ideas, we are recognising the existence of actual relations among ideas and are therefore treating them as independently existing things. On the other hand, if to *have* an idea is to know all about it, if there is nothing more in it than we know, since, as Berkeley and Hume make out, "our idea" is just what we know, then we cannot be wrong about it; and the supposed relations, of coherence and incoherence, are either just ideas among others, or else are outside the region of ideas altogether, and in neither case do we have the adjustment or maladjustment which the theory requires.

The main error of this view—an error which appears also in the correspondence theory and in many other philosophical doctrines—lies in the assumption that there is a kind of knowledge which cannot be mistaken as contrasted with that which can; that, e.g., minds can receive “data” about which there is no dubiety, and can then “interpret” them in various ways which may possibly be mistaken. A sufficient objection to such theories is that they imply a kind of knowledge which both can and cannot be mistaken. Thus the recognition of the fact that “A is an interpretation of the datum B” must be at once the work of the fallible and of the infallible faculty. To avoid this difficulty we have to say that the fallible faculty can also be acquainted with “data”, which must therefore be matters of as much dubiety as “interpretations”. In short, the indubitable cannot be brought into relation with the “doubtful”, i.e., with any real issue, and the solution is that there is *no* infallible kind of knowledge.

This appears again in connection with the correspondence theory. Merely to have an idea which is *like* an outside thing is not on the face of it any better than having an idea which is *unlike* an outside thing; and the latter is not on the face of it *error*. Error arises only if we think the unlike is like, i.e., if we make a direct comparison between “ideas” and outside things; and this comparison is on exactly the same footing as a comparison between one outside thing and another. Thus the question of “ideas” does not arise at all in the general treatment of error, and it can arise in particular cases only if an “idea” is a certain sort of thing, existing perhaps in a special location (e.g., in a mind), but having the same type of independent existence, being on the same logical footing, as a thing existing in some other location (e.g., in a tree). The correspondence and coherence theories alike fail, then, because they cannot avoid admitting, at some point, the realist contention that we are dealing all the time with independent things—with what exists, whatever its location and character may be.

The doctrine of striving, on the other hand, permits us to distinguish cases where we are mistaken from cases where we are not. We are right, it may be said, when we get what we strive for and wrong when we do not. Error, at least, is comparable to missing one’s mark (mis-taking); and here the Freudian theory of errors as satisfactions of (unacknowledged) wishes is important. We are in error when we treat A, which is not B, as if it were B; when we mistakenly *use* it as a B—e.g., when we treat a red danger signal as if it

were a green safety signal, or treat as a friend a man who will actually deceive us. This clearly implies a certain knowledge of both A and B, i.e., error is impossible without knowledge; knowledge is primary, error secondary—but, of course, that is actually the case. It is to be noted that we are sometimes undeceived and sometimes not. The fact that we do not always find out afterwards what mistakes we have made, and the fact that we do not always know what we are doing or what our actions will lead to, are among the obstacles to a thorough discussion of error.

Error, then, is exemplified in misuse of things (using a pruning-knife to cut down a gum-tree or a sledge-hammer to crush a wasp), and arises in our striving, with the means at our disposal, to satisfy our wishes; or, as I should put it, in our motives themselves, our tendencies or mental tensions, striving to find an object, to find outlet or release. *We believe what eases our minds*,¹ whether it is true or false. Freud's theory, of the wish and Alexander's identification of the theoretical and the practical (treating judging, e.g., as Descartes also does, as a form of willing) have prepared the way for this development of psychological theory, in spite of incidental cognitionalist confusions. The theory of the mental tension appears also in James's account of the "active gap" in our "consciousness" when we are striving to recall a forgotten name. And if we take all knowledge as discovery,² then we have a general recognition of tension; and that is known or found, we may say, which releases the tension and sets our minds at rest—or, at least, a part of our minds; we have, of course, many quests, not only successively but at any given time.

This conational view is also in accordance with the whole modern doctrine of *interests*, as guiding our lives and constituting our mental character (though acceptance of that doctrine has to be distinguished from the adoption of any special theory of "instinct"). Even those who speak of "intellect" have still to recognise "intellectual interests", a "passion for truth" and the like. But when all has been

¹ See Addendum (p. 90).

² This is the important point about knowledge, even in cases where it is also *recovery*, i.e., where we have already had that knowledge and are now "recalling" it. The doctrine of reminiscence, in implying that *all* knowledge is recovery, involves an infinite regress. But the value of Socrates's doctrine lies just in his pointing out, as against the Sophistic "instructors", that knowledge is not a passive *taking in*. This recognition of activity in knowing involves the rejection of the "storehouse" theory of knowledge (the conception of the mind as a receptacle into which so much knowledge can be packed), which, along with the correspondence theory, is thoroughly disposed of in the *Theaetetus*. The doctrine of reminiscence is a curious mixture of the two opposing views—*discovery* of the characters of particulars, and a *storing* of the knowledge of forms.

said that can be said on the conational side, we find that we have still not learned what are the qualities of mental processes themselves, what it is that may be in tension or relaxed. Striving, like knowing, is a relation, and the mental quality (mentality) is still to seek.

FEELING.

This brings us to the third element in the original classification—feeling (affect, emotion). And this, I think, enables us to solve our difficulties; it gives us a basis for a general descriptive account of mind, i.e., we can recognise “affects” as real *qualities* of mental processes (or, what comes to the same thing, as real mental processes), whatever relations, knowing, striving or other, they may have to other things.

McDougall (in “Social Psychology”) does something to suggest this view, but he makes a very unsound division of mental process into a cognitive (leading up, afferent) part, an emotional (central) part, and a conative (efferent) part—as if the process as a whole could have the relations of knowing and striving only by having a knowing part, etc., and as if the central part were not as definitely related to outside things as afferent and efferent nervous processes are. In this division, in fact, we find traces of cognitionalism and also of physiologism, i.e., of the kind of view which expresses mental facts in terms of the physiological processes to which they are related (as knowledge is called “sensory” because it is related to sense-organs)—though the rejection of physiologism does not imply that mental processes are not themselves physiological. Nevertheless, for McDougall, the central and most distinctively mental part of the process is emotional; and so, if it is mind that we regard as having the relations of knowing and striving, we may go on to express the position by saying that emotions (or feelings) know, emotions strive and, in general, interact with other things.

Interacting is, of course, something that all things can do; and it may be that the relations which we can in the end recognise as knowing and striving are not peculiar to mind at all (cf. Alexander’s account of knowing as “com-presence”), and that we have thought otherwise solely because we have thought *into* the mind’s relations something of its own emotional quality. It is enough, however, for our present purpose that an emotional thing can have these relations; and from this point of view we should reject the cognitionalist formula of Freud about “an idea becoming charged with affect” and speak instead of *a feeling finding an object*.

Such expressions sound harsh, but only to ears attuned to cognitionalism. The real confusion comes from the opposite quarter, in the recognition of "reason", "intellect", "sensation" and so forth—as when McDougall, after making the instincts the native mental forces, introduces a complicating factor of reason,¹ instead of recognising that what reasons is simply a complex of the emotional activities he has already dealt with, and not a new faculty springing from nowhere. Once we have rejected "constitutive relations", once we have seen that what knows and reasons *must* have qualities of its own, we can say that emotion is as likely to know as anything else; we cannot reject it as a possible knower merely because it is a quality, since we should thus be thrust back on the supposition of something which *consists* in its relations.

The objection that feeling also is a relation comes from the same cognitionalist source. On the theory of mind as feeling it is not denied but asserted that feelings *have* relations and hence that we can be angry at, afraid of, pleased with, something or other (this being to say that we are angry, knowing something, or that our anger has an object, i.e., knows something, etc.). But to have a relation is not to *be* a relation. The term "feeling" has certainly been employed to signify some sort of "immediate experience" (*erlebnis*) in which knower and known are one. This appears in Alexander's use of the term "enjoyment", and also in the use of the term "feeling" ("sensation" being sometimes substituted) by such thinkers as Bradley, but especially by James, who, in his "Principles of Psychology", speaks of feelings of red, of green, etc., and again of feelings of and, but, etc. Such views fall with the rejection of relativism (the belief in constitutive relations), whilst at the same time they testify to a certain recognition of the "inwardness" of feeling. What should be admitted is that feelings (e.g., anger and fear) are qualitatively different from one another, though they still have the general feeling-quality in common. It will not surprise us then to find that, besides having similar relations to outside things, they also have different relations to these things, e.g., that they have different objects, that one seeks what another avoids, etc.

The thorough-going rejection of cognitionalist doctrine involves the recognition of the following facts: (a) that a mental process may exist in us without our knowing it (as when we find out afterwards that we *were* angry or afraid); (b) that a mental process may exist without knowing (as in

¹ *Vide* "Social Psychology", Supplementary Chapter I (in fifth and subsequent editions).

what are called "nameless fears"); (c) that nothing mental is simple or passive, but that we have a vast complication of tendencies (tensions) which pass through one another, and become variously organised, in pursuits and aversions, strivings and capitulations, sentiments and interests of all descriptions; that "intellectual pursuits" are thus operations of the *love of truth* (the inquiring spirit), developing from original scattered curiosities—for we have no reason to suppose that all curiosities are parts of *one* curiosity, all angers the work of a single faculty of Anger, etc. We thus have a conception of mind as a society or economy of impulses or activities of an emotional character. This conception of our "motives", conscious or unconscious, as emotions will, I am convinced, give coherence to psycho-analytic doctrine, and, though this is a point of less immediate importance, will be found to work in with the physiological examination of those brain processes (in their relation to bodily processes in general) which are "the seat of" the emotions, i.e., which are the mind.

We may here refer to the James-Lange theory (which is, of course, of a cognitionalist character) of emotions as "sensations of certain bodily processes". In the first place, "organic sensations", regarded as objects, are *the organic processes themselves* and thus are distinct from the special class of emotional or mental activities, even though the latter are also organic; e.g., if we mean by hunger what is going on in the stomach, it is not mental. On the other hand, if by "organic sensation" we mean *what knows* the organic process in question, then we have still to be informed where and what that knower is—what *qualities* it has. It is not, of course, the case that we are sorry because we weep, etc., but it may quite well be the case that, on a given occasion, we *find out* that we are sorry by noticing that we are weeping, find out that we are afraid by noting the condition of our breathing, and so on. We are not, as has been seen, bound to know directly what is going on in our mind, and in such cases we may discover it inferentially. But this inference depends on the previous observation of a connection between the two, between the (central) emotional process of sorrow and the (peripheral) process of weeping; which implies that we have a direct acquaintance with both terms of this relation.

The same circumstance, that we are not bound to know what is in our mind, accounts for the fact that many emotions have no names or are named only from their objects (e.g., as "love of" something), these objects, which the emotions themselves are interested in, being naturally what is known

when they are operating, and attention, by other emotions, being directed to the former emotions only rarely—e.g., when they are obstructed. Progress in psychology may therefore be made by the actual *discovery* of the emotional character of sentiments or motives, i.e., of what is in our minds, as contrasted with what is *before* our minds, when we engage in certain pursuits.

These, however, are matters of detail. The main points are: (1) that knowing and striving, as relations, cannot be the *character* (“mentality”) of the mental; (2) that feelings, as qualitative (a point which is illustrated by the qualitative distinctions among feelings), are capable of characterising the mental—as well as of having relations to other things; (3) that we must assume that they do, that feeling is mentality, unless we are going to suppose that some entirely unsuspected character of mind has yet to come to light; but (a) as we have seen, there are multifarious suggestions that feeling is already, if only confusedly, recognised as the mental quality;¹ and (b) we do recognise and speak of *minds* and therefore we must already have recognised some mental quality. To say that we know mind only as “that whereby” certain effects are produced or arrangements made is to say that we do not know mind at all—for how, except by observation, do we know *what* sort of thing would have these effects or that there *is* a thing, of some peculiar kind, to have them? In fact, the rejection of the belief in constitutive relations implies that to know a thing is to know some of its qualities. We are thus in a position to say that mind *is* feeling, and that it is such feelings that *have* objects.

Having this basis, we can go on to discuss how feelings develop and interact, how they are affected by the bodily organisation in general, and how by things outside the body, including feelings in other minds—in which connection McDougall’s theory of “sympathetic induction” is of interest—and for this discussion we shall also have to take into account how they affect these other things. This discussion (including, of course, an account of what various feelings there are) will be psychology.

ADDENDUM.

Some further remarks on the connection between belief and behaviour may help to remove difficulties in regard to

¹ Cf. also Stekel’s view that nothing in the dream is true except the emotion. Dreams are one important ground of opposition to the behaviourist view that the difference, say, between anger and fear is just the difference between facing up and cowering or running away, i.e., that there is no difference of emotional quality.

what has been said about conation. It was contended that on the view that it is certain interests that know, certain feelings operating so as to secure "outlet" or relaxation of tension, an account can be given of error and other difficulties which the ordinary theories of knowledge cannot meet. In terms of the formula that we believe what eases our minds, it appears that we shall refuse to accept situations which we find intolerable. Now this attitude of opposition to situations which occasion us uneasiness or distress can operate in various ways according to personal as well as external factors (the breadth of our interests, the difficulty of the situation, etc.). The simplest case is that in which our uneasiness expresses itself simply by removing the obstacle, so that uneasiness ceases, i.e., we are satisfied with what is the case, and there is no question of error. But, since error does occur, we require a more general formulation of the position, covering all cases.

It may be said, then, that there is in general a *tendency* to remove obstacles; or it may be enough to say that there is striving. Now, in terms of the conational theory outlined, what is striven for will be identical with what is believed. As Alexander points out, if we will that a certain person should leave the room, then the situation we have before our minds as occurring is just *that person being out of the room*; the object of our judging is identical with the objective of our willing. The success of the judging, the "click" of conviction, the "satisfaction that" the event is so, is identical with the success of the willing and the relaxation of tension.

Obviously there may be complications in the case; while having as our object the person's absence, we may recognise that he is not yet gone. But, in the first place, we can have opposing interests and thus opposing judgments. And, secondly, we can recognise phases in a situation; we can find the person's presence temporarily tolerable (and therefore admissible as a fact) because it is a stage in the process leading up to his absence, when we shall be quite satisfied. In other words, we can distinguish a main objective from subordinate objectives which are means to it or preliminary conditions of it, and on the theoretical side this is expressed by saying that we recognise not merely single situations but implications (or, more generally, the passage of one situation into another), this being the state of affairs to which the term *thinking* is ordinarily attached, just as *conduct* is commonly taken as the carrying of a line of action through a series of stages.

The general position is, then, that we regard what we want as brought about, and if our action (or simply our

situation) is such as to bring it about—if we get what we want—then we have a true belief. In certain cases, however, our action is unsuccessful; and then, though there are various possibilities according to the variety and development of our interests or demands, our primary tendency, Alexander contends (in line with the views of the Freudian school, particularly as expressed by Freud himself and by Ferenczi), is to regard the wished-for result as brought about. That is to say, we obtain a certain satisfaction or release of tension under a condition of hallucination or illusion. Such a condition, it is to be observed, is not logically different from error in general. To suppose that it is is to suppose some objective situation of a simpler type than the proposition (hallucination being conceived, e.g., as a "datum" which does not "correspond to" reality).

One possible way of obtaining ease of mind or release of tension, then, is the false belief that the object has been achieved; but the fact that it has not may result in a continuance or re-establishment of tension. We know that this is not bound to be the case; there are people who retain false beliefs throughout their lives or at least are never disabused of certain errors—indeed, this could be said of any of us. But still there are cases where our satisfaction proves evanescent, where we are undeceived, and the demand for the thing itself, for "real" as opposed to "hallucinatory" satisfaction, is reinstated. In such cases the object may eventually be obtained or we may secure some substitute for it—in any case, the tension has to be diminished in some fashion, or the position really would be intolerable.

This process of finding substitutive satisfaction has been dealt with in detail by Freud and his followers. The point to be emphasised here is that it is just the process of developing a theory of things, so far as we do develop a theory; and it may be incidentally observed that the distinction of "illusion" from "reality", i.e., the recognition that we are capable of falling into error, is a considerable theoretical step. But, as Freud has also shown, unsatisfied tendencies may remain in a state of subdued tension, of repression, in which they do not secure outlet but, on the one hand, draw away energy from the operation of the interests in general, leaving the person comparatively inactive, and, on the other hand, interfere with the other interests, altering the direction of their activity, and thus precipitating (a) those confusions and mistakes which Freud deals with under the heading "Psycho-Pathology of Everyday Life", and (b) the *dream* form of hallucination. We can distinguish, then, a number of different

types of reaction to an unsatisfactory situation—there is simple hallucination; there are various forms of self-deception and confusion, whereby we contrive to hold contradictory beliefs at the same time; there are various methods of substituting one object for another; and finally there is the possibility of such a rearrangement of tensions (i.e., such a development of the mind) that repression and dissatisfaction are overcome—though we may admit that this development will never go so far as to enable *all* our tendencies to find outlet.

In line with these distinctions, we may distinguish from simple error various forms of “interpretation” of the things we deal with—as when it is said that we interpret the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. Here, on the one hand, we can have that dictation to Nature, or looking for simple solutions, of which Heraclitus accused the Pythagoreans, and which is bound to land us in error; but we can also have simple insistence on special uses of certain things, emphasis on some aspects of them at the expense of others—a preference which need not in itself amount to misuse or confusion. Granted that we have interests and that it is these interests that operate on things and give us our knowledge, then it is naturally the case that we select certain characters of things for special attention and neglect others, and thus that we select those most familiar or easy to deal with or most satisfactory to us. This selectiveness is in fact the condition alike of error and of discovery.

Now in this connection Heraclitus upholds the replacing of desire by understanding, and similarly Freud speaks of passing from the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle, getting an interest in things as they are as contrasted with what we should want them to be. Clearly we must be wary of over-stressing such a transition, since understanding, or adherence to the reality-principle, is still the operation of an interest, and desire (or what follows the pleasure-principle) even in the first instance finds things to be the case, whether correctly or incorrectly. It is not a question, then, of a theoretical interest coming out of a non-theoretical interest. We may admit that peculiarly scientific interests can be developed, but we shall still have to say that, as interests, they have special objects, and that there are special conditions of their finding outlet. It is therefore not surprising that we find throughout the history of scientific inquiry a recurrence of that dictation to Nature (as contrasted with “expecting the unexpected”) which Heraclitus condemned in the Pythagoreans.

Of course, inquiry, confused or otherwise, expresses itself in saying that something is the case, and such an assertion must be met in the first instance by showing that it is not the case; only after that has been done can we go on to the question of how the particular inquirer came to prefer his erroneous view. But, while that is the *form* of argument, of refutation or proof, the carrying out of arguments or inquiries is still the work of our wants or interests, and the notion of a "dispassionate reason" rests on a confusion between the *objectivity* of the issue (i.e., the simple contrast between truth and falsity, occurrence and non-occurrence) and the activity of the inquirer into that issue. And along with the notion of dispassionate reason we must reject the notion of "reasonable conduct", or conduct enjoined by reason. The most that can be meant by reasonable conduct is *the thing that is to be done*, i.e., what is demanded by certain interests; and, since this will obviously differ from what is demanded by other interests, we see that "what is to be done" is a relative expression and that there can be no absolute "duty". It appears, then, that the clearing away of cognitionalist confusions is also of advantage to the ethical inquirer—as it must be to any inquirer whose field includes any part of human behaviour.

FOUR MEN TALK ABOUT GOD.

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I.

Agnostic.—In a case like this, there is only one course open to a reasonable man—suspense of judgment. There is evidence on both sides, but no proof. We must recognise, then, that with our finite intelligence we cannot obtain any certain knowledge whether or not there is an infinite intelligence which creates and sustains the world. We can only weigh the conflicting probabilities furnished by our experience of the world. And in my own experience, and, I believe, in the experience of most other men, the probabilities are too nearly balanced for a definite decision to be possible.

Protestant.—But you can't reach God by searching Him out like that. He has to search you out. The living belief in God which is possessed by a Christian, which possesses a Christian, is an immediate conviction which could not possibly be attained by any weighing of probabilities. I am as certain of God's existence as I am of yours or my own—I have a living experience of God.

Agnostic.—But what about me? Without any similar conviction of my own, I cannot regard yours as deciding the question. I can only regard it as one of the many bits of evidence that have to be taken into consideration in this matter. And I am afraid that I am not justified, scientifically, in according it any more weight than the conviction of Atheist that there is no God.

Protestant.—But surely you cannot weigh his ignorance against my knowledge. What I offer is the evidence of an eye-witness—not one bit of circumstantial evidence to set against other bits. I tell you that I have experienced God as directly and immediately as I have experienced anything—more directly. You say that you haven't and Atheist hasn't. Is your lack of experience to be set against my experience? Will you say that the chances are a thousand to one against the existence of the Pyramids because there are a thousand men that have not seen them for every one that has?

Atheist.—But what precisely is this religious experience of yours, Protestant? It is true that you cannot argue that a thing doesn't exist because a great many men are ignorant of it. And no doubt my ignorance of God and the ignorance of Agnostic cannot be set against your knowledge—if you have knowledge. But that is just the point: how are we to know that you have knowledge? How do you know yourself? After all, you know, error is nearly as common as ignorance.

Protestant.—Now you are asking for the impossible. The knowledge of God cannot be certified. But, then, neither can the knowledge of anything else—except to a very limited extent and never in regard to ultimates. In the last resort all knowledge has to be regarded as self-certifying. Why not, then, my knowledge of God? You cannot go outside experience to guarantee what you find within experience. You simply have to accept it.

Atheist.—That only means that you cannot know without knowing, which doesn't seem to help much. At any rate it doesn't answer my question. How do you know that your experience is an experience of *God* and not, say, the after-effects of a good meal?

Protestant.—Well, how do I know when you look at this bit of paint that you are having an experience of red? If you can answer that question, I'll answer yours.

Atheist.—I am afraid that won't do. Red is not a theory about the universe: God is. What you are saying is that your experience provides a proof of Theism and I am not saying anything like that when I say that paint is red. If you want a parallel to your "religious experience" you will have to find a physicist with a "relativity experience" or a biologist with an "evolutionary experience".

Protestant.—Well, all that I can say is, that if you had had a religious experience, you would know very well how it certifies itself as an experience of God. But since you lack that experience—and, I am afraid, deliberately harden yourself against it—it is useless to talk to you. It is an impossible task—like describing glories of colour to a man who has been blind from birth.

Atheist.—But that is not the point. You say that you have had an experience. That is all right—no one is going to deny that. But then you go on to say that it is an experience of *God*. And when you say that, you are not merely describing the quality of your experience or its intensity or anything like that. You are saying something quite different. You are saying that, in that experience,

you are aware that all the things of this world are the creatures of an infinitely perfect Creator. And what I want to know is how any single experience could possibly supply you with all that information.

Agnostic.—Well, isn't it possible to say that a man's belief that he has had an experience of God is verified by its consequences—like any other hypothesis? Religious faith does work, you know. A man does sometimes manage to pull himself together under its influence when all other influences have failed. And the same thing can sometimes be seen on a larger scale with whole communities—the Pitcairn Islanders, for instance. Don't cases like that prove, or at least tend to confirm, a man's assertion that his experience really was of God?

Atheist.—No, they don't. All they prove is that a belief in God is sometimes efficacious in promoting the survival of men. And exactly the same thing can be said of any belief that is strongly held—of Communism, for example. But just as the survival effects of a belief in Communism do not prove the truth of Communism, so the survival effects of a belief in God do not prove the existence of God.

Agnostic.—But why not? A belief in Communism is really a belief that society is of such and such a nature. And if people act on this assumption and the results agree with their expectations, surely they have verified the hypothesis at least as certainly as a scientist verifies the hypothesis, for example, that an acid neutralizes an alkali. Similarly a belief in God is really a belief that the universe is of such and such a nature, and that should be capable of verification in the same sort of way. The only difficulty seems to be that nobody is very sure just what is implied by this hypothesis.

Atheist.—I should have distinguished between the survival effects of a belief in Communism when it is held by an individual in a non-communist society and when it is held by a communist society. In the latter case, I agree, the survival of the society will verify the belief of its members in exactly the same way as a successful experiment verifies a chemical hypothesis. But not in the former case, when the individual survives. The survival effects of a belief in Communism in that case would not prove the truth of Communism because the same effects might equally well have been brought about by some other belief—by a belief in Fascism, for example. It is possible—and probable—that the survival effects of beliefs of this sort in these circumstances do not depend at all on *what* is believed, but simply on the fact *that* it is believed. And with regard to a belief in God, I

will go further and say that its survival effects cannot possibly depend on anything else in any circumstances. This belief may, and does, enable men to live longer because it gives them something to live for. But from the very nature of the belief it can't enable them to live longer because it is true.

Agnostic.—But why not? I admit that in some instances the usefulness of a belief in God depends more or less demonstrably on the fact that it is held with some fervour. And I admit that this is a possible explanation of its usefulness in all instances. But I cannot agree that no other explanation is possible. It may be difficult to verify the other explanation—that it is useful because it is true. That is because it is difficult to see precisely what is asserted by a belief in God and how *that* can be verified. But, if the belief has any significance at all, it must assert something about the universe which can be verified by examination. And if that assertion is true, then, presumably, it is useful to know that it is true.

Atheist.—But that is just the trouble. A belief in God is not a belief that the universe has a certain nature. It is a belief that the universe is created by a perfect being *who might equally well have left it uncreated*. And that is why it is not merely difficult, but impossible, to verify the hypothesis of God from an examination of the universe. On this hypothesis the universe becomes a sort of epiphenomenon which cannot verify anything.

Agnostic.—But surely if the belief in God is a belief that the universe is created by a perfect being, it must be based on some perfection that has been found in the universe.

Atheist.—No. It is an essential part of God's perfection that He should be absolutely independent of anything else. And so you can't argue to His existence from the existence of anything else.

Agnostic.—Well, I am prepared to accept your first point, Atheist, but I don't see how you can possibly be right about the second. I can see that it is necessary to distinguish between the realised expectations which verify an assumption and those which do not. And I am prepared to admit that the survival effects of a belief in God do not *necessarily* imply the existence of God. But I still maintain that there is a *possibility* that men who hold this belief do as a matter of fact survive because this belief is true. And I completely disagree with your assertion that the assumption of God raises *no* expectation about the nature of the universe which would enable the assumption to be verified. If that were true, the

term God could mean nothing to us and there would be no possible way of proving His existence.

* * *

Atheist.—Well, Protestant is not the first to maintain that the experience of God is self-certifying. That has been held by a great many philosophers. But then they, unlike Protestant, have also held that in this respect the experience of God is quite unlike the experience of anything else. It is God, and God alone, they have held, whose existence can be proved merely from the idea that we have of Him.

Agnostic.—I suppose you mean the “ontological argument”—that God is a completely perfect being and therefore cannot lack existence. Otherwise He would not be perfect.

Atheist.—Yes. It is true that the experience of God which is presupposed in this argument is very much less than the experience which Protestant starts with. It consists only in the apprehension of the meaning of the word “God”. But from the point of view of philosophy, of course, the less we presuppose the better. And this statement of the religious experience argument has the further advantage that, presupposing less, it goes much further. It can be used against anybody who understands the meaning of the term “God”. And it is argued with some plausibility that even the fool who denies the existence of God will have to admit that he understands what he is denying.

Agnostic.—Well, the fallacy in the ontological argument has been pointed out often enough. I have an idea of God as a completely perfect being. A completely perfect being will also have the perfection of existence. Therefore my idea of God must include the idea of existence. That is all that follows—not that God actually exists, but only that the *idea* of existence is contained in the *idea* of God.

Atheist.—But all the same, the ontological argument is the only way of proving the existence of God. And if it cannot prove His existence—well, then, it proves His non-existence. It still remains as important as it was ever thought to be by Anselm, Descartes and Hegel, because its consideration provides the quickest and surest way of demonstrating the truth of Atheism. Or at least what comes to the same thing, its failure shows the utter impossibility of obtaining any consistent statement of Theism.

Protestant.—How on earth do you make that out?

Atheist.—God is perfect and therefore self-sufficient. He cannot therefore be proved to exist through the existence of

anything else because His existence does not depend on the existence of anything else. Finally, indeed, nothing else exists besides Him. And so He must be proved to exist through Himself alone. Now the ontological argument is the only argument which attempts to do this. Since that fails, then, there can be no case for Theism. If Theism were sound the ontological argument would be sound. Since the ontological argument is not sound, Theism is not sound.

Catholic.—I think you've omitted to draw a very important distinction—that, namely, between the system of reality and the system of knowledge. In reality, I agree, the existence of God is demonstrable from the nature of God, since nothing is more certain than that He derives His existence from Himself. And so the ontological argument must not only be a sound argument for His existence, but the soundest argument. So far, then, I agree with you. But it does not follow that we with our limited knowledge should be able to see that it is sound. The divine Existence is demonstrable from the divine Nature only when that Nature is adequately known. And it is not adequately known in this life. Perhaps I might put it that the ontological argument is sound *de jure* but not *de facto*. Nor does it follow—and this is the more important point at the moment—that in default of the ontological argument we are left without any other evidence of the existence of God. We may not be able to comprehend the essence of God in itself, but we can apprehend Him to some extent through His effects. And that apprehension is, in point of fact, sufficient to prove His existence in this life.

Atheist.—Well, I don't see how you can know that an argument is sound unless you know that it is sound. But never mind that now. What I should like to know now is how you are going to justify the distinction between the essence of God and His effects. If you assume that God's effects exist apart from God Himself, you will be admitting surely, that He may be limited by His effects. And then, ceasing to be omnipotent, He will cease to be God. That is why I say that the ontological argument is the only argument which *could* prove the existence of God—in this life or any other life. It is the only argument which avoids this assumption.

Catholic.—Well, this is the position. Theism asserts that the universe is created by a perfect being. And so we can approach the consideration of Theism from two sides: either from the consideration of the nature of this being, or from the consideration of the nature of the universe. The first

approach gives us the ontological argument which, as I have explained, I believe to be true in reality but not available to our limited intelligences. And we are left, then, with the second approach which gives us the arguments from motion, from causation, from design, and so on.

Atheist.—But you don't seem to understand my objection. You say that the first approach fails and therefore we must fall back on the second. But this is just what I am suggesting we cannot do. I am suggesting that there are no alternatives to the ontological argument.

Protestant.—Why not? The thing is of no importance. It is a sort of trick which bears no relation to anything that anybody really thinks—least of all to my attempt to state the Christian position. A child can see the absurdity of trying to prove the existence of anything through the fact that someone has an idea of it. And it is obvious that in default of the direct experience which I assert, it can only be proved through the existence of something else.

Atheist.—I agree, of course, that the ontological argument is invalid. But that is not the point. What I am suggesting is that the failure of the ontological argument involves the failure of Theism.

Protestant.—Well that, I think, is the queerest observation I ever heard on this subject.

Atheist.—It seems straightforward enough to me: The existence of God can only be proved, you seem to admit, through the existence of something else. But the existence of God cannot be proved through the existence of anything else because there are no other existents besides Him. He is the self-subsistent on whom all other things depend for their existence. “In Him we live and move and have our being”, you remember. Well, what is the conclusion? The existence of God can be proved only through the existence of other things. There are no other things. Therefore the existence of God cannot be proved at all. That is the plain consequence of your rejection of the ontological argument. If you throw that over, you throw over Theism.

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Catholic.—But aren't you confusing Theism with Pantheism? The assumption on which your argument depends is that God alone exists; that is, that God is the formal being of all things. And this is expressly denied in Theism, or at least in Christian Theism. If you want texts, consider these: “God is high and elevated”—“He is over all things”. God is the creator of all things. But He must not

therefore be identified with His creatures. There is, you know, some difference between the philosophies of Saint Thomas and Spinoza.

Atheist.—Yes, but it is only the difference between a partial and a complete presentation of what is fundamentally the same doctrine. If Thomas had really thought out his Theism to the end, there would have been no need for Spinoza's supplement. All that Spinoza did was to follow the argument for Theism as it had been stated by the Scholastics, notably, of course, by Thomas. And then it turned out to be Pantheism. And that is my reply to your objection. I am not confusing Theism with Pantheism—I am saying that Theism is an unstable position which can only reach some measure of stability by becoming Pantheism. And then I am saying that Pantheism is indistinguishable from Atheism. Spinoza's contemporaries were quite right, and all the modern talk about the "God-drunken" man is nonsense. If God is everything, He is nothing. And we are left, then, with the things of this world as they appear to be, without any supernatural support.

Catholic.—There is no need to convince me of the second part of your thesis—that Pantheism is Atheism. I am already convinced of that. But I am still waiting conviction regarding the first part—that Theism is Pantheism.

Agnostic.—Well, you know, Catholic, a good many theologians have spent a good deal of time trying to elucidate the Problem of Free Will, without any marked success. And the difficulty there seems to be exactly the same as the difficulty that Atheist is trying to point out in regard to Theism generally. It is the difficulty of maintaining the independence of the finite creature in face of the omnipotence of his Creator.

Catholic.—I think that that difficulty will disappear if you consider what creation really involves. God wills all that is requisite for the things which He wills. And so He creates things with the contingency or necessity that is proper to them. It is therefore no argument against the freedom of men to say that God has created them and therefore they cannot be free. On the contrary, God has created men free because it is proper for them to be free.—And similarly with things generally. It does not follow that the things of this world have no existence apart from the existence of God, because He has created them. On the contrary, in creating them He has endowed them with an existence apart from His own. And thus, being their creator, God both transcends

and is immanent in His creatures. That is the meaning of creation.

Atheist.—Of course that is the meaning of creation. That is my objection: that the meaning of creation is self-contradictory. It cannot be true both that a thing is completely dependent on another thing and also that it is independent. And yet that is what you have to say of anything that you assert to be created.

Protestant.—But surely, *Atheist*, you can say that a thing is dependent on another thing in some respects and independent in some respects.

Atheist.—Not if the other thing is God. You cannot say that the things of this world are independent of God in any respect. He is omnipotent. Otherwise you admit a plurality of gods.

Catholic.—But can't you see, *Atheist*, that your argument, so far from invalidating my defence of God's transcendence, actually strengthens it? You insist on God's omnipotence. Very well, then; surely that omnipotence would be denied if God's creation were limited to things of a certain sort. But it is exactly this limitation that you assert when you say that God could not endow His creatures with an existence distinct from His own. You argue that the Divine omnipotence is incompatible with transcendence. I retort that it would be incompatible with anything but transcendence.

Protestant.—And it is a good retort, too. I know, *Atheist*, that you regard this sort of discussion as a game or a contest. And so I discount a good deal of what you say. But it really is very painful to me to hear you laying down the law about what God can do and what He cannot do. You ought to reflect that there are a good many things that you don't know.

Atheist.—But surely, *Catholic*, if God creates things with the sort of existence that is proper to them, He must also create them in the sort of way that is proper to Him. In His creation it is obvious, I should think, that He cannot lose His omnipotence. But how can he fail to lose his omnipotence if He creates things that are independent of Him?

Agnostic.—So far as I can see, both your arguments are sound. God wouldn't be omnipotent unless He *could* create things with an independent existence, and yet He won't be omnipotent if He *does*. If, then, God is omnipotent, it must be that He *could* but He *doesn't*. God's omnipotence can be

maintained only if it is not exercised—like freedom of speech, you know, in times of disturbance.

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Catholic.—It is sometimes difficult, I admit, to obtain an adequate statement of all the implications of Theism. But then you must remember what I said previously: that in this life we are unable to comprehend the nature of God in Himself and are dependent for our knowledge of Him on our knowledge of His effects. And while these effects reveal something of their First Cause—sufficient to assert His existence and to say something about His nature—they do not reveal everything. And so there is bound to be some verbal difficulty when we try to describe Him in terms drawn from our experience of this world, although these are the only terms available to us.

Agnostic.—I think that there is a good deal to be said for that, *Catholic*: If God did exist, we could not expect the clear and distinct account of His relation to the things of this world that *Atheist* demands, simply because we ourselves are things of this world. And the fact, then, that this account cannot be given is not a conclusive argument against the existence of God. It would be conclusive if our minds worked *in vacuo*—completely unaffected by our relations—our other relations—to the things we are considering. But that is plainly not the case. In any observation we have to allow for the position of the observer.

Protestant.—That is very true, *Agnostic*. Just as the astronomer in observing the movements of the stars has to allow for his own position on the earth, so the philosopher in discussing God has to allow for his own position as a creature of God. *Atheist*'s great mistake is that he forgets the limitations of the intellect. And he does that because he forgets that man is far more than intellect.

Atheist.—Well, it is illuminating to see how you all line up as sceptics in opposition to *Atheism*.

Catholic.—Nothing of the sort. The suggestion is not that you should abandon the use of your intellect, but simply that you should recognise the limitations which attach to it when it is associated with a finite body tied down to a particular time and place. And if that is scepticism, then every astronomer and every physicist—every scientist—is a sceptic.

Atheist.—But you are saying that we can *never* know God's relation to His creatures while we retain our creaturely position. You are not saying that we have a particular view of God in order to allow for the particular consequences that

that has for our knowledge—which is the procedure in scientific observation. You are saying that we have a particular point of view in order to stop further inquiry—in order to deny that we can have any knowledge at all of God's relation to His creatures. And if that isn't scepticism, it certainly commits the typical fallacy of scepticism.

Agnostic.—What do you mean? What is the objection to scepticism?

Atheist.—The old objection—that the sceptic contradicts himself in assuming the knowledge that he denies. Catholic is saying that our relation to God is such that we cannot know our relation to God. And so he, at least, has transcended the limitations which he asserts can never be transcended.

Agnostic.—That objection, I agree, may hold against Catholic and Protestant, but not, I think, against me. You may reasonably complain that while they recognise your intellectual limitations in refusing to allow you to deny the existence of God, they fail to recognise their own in asserting His existence. But I am quite impartial in the matter. I believe that the assertion and the denial of God are equally beyond us.

Atheist.—But why? Catholic and Protestant contradict themselves when they say that we cannot know our relation to God because of our relation to God. But so far as I can see, you have no reason at all for doubting our competence to decide the truth or falsity of Theism.

Agnostic.—Well, I should have thought that this discussion itself provided ample reason. It certainly shows that Theism is obscure. And then there are three possible explanations of its obscurity: either it is obscure because it is false, or because it is true, or because we are incompetent to decide whether it is true or false. You say that it is obscure because it is false. But Catholic and Protestant say that it is obscure because it is true. We cannot, they hold, know all about God because we are God's creatures. And since I see no way of deciding between these conflicting explanations, I prefer simply to say that it is obscure and leave it at that.

Atheist.—That amounts to saying that we are incompetent to decide the truth of anything which we have not decided unanimously. And if you really believe that, you will have to conclude that we are incompetent to decide the truth of nearly everything—including Agnosticism.—But it is no use trying to decide this issue by counting heads. You have to follow the argument. And I am not saying merely that Theism is obscure, I am saying that it is self-contradicting.

dictory, like the scepticism which is used to bolster it up—like the idea of a square circle. And there is no more reason to believe that the idea of Theism is beyond our competence than the idea of a square circle—unless you begin by assuming that Theism is true.

Agnostic.—But surely, Atheist, you cannot really believe that the idea of God is to be disposed of in this summary way. Surely you cannot leave out of consideration altogether the millions of men whose lives have revolved round the worship of God, especially since we continue to feel in ourselves exactly the same impulse to worship. I am not arguing that the existence of the impulse implies the existence of its object. Any argument of that sort seems quite indefensible. But I cannot agree that the persistence of the impulse has no bearing on the matter. Surely the impulse could not have persisted unless it had sometimes been gratified. And surely it is at least possible that it has been gratified, as the worshipper believes, by the God he worships.

Atheist.—Quite possible, until you investigate the matter. And then you find that God cannot exist because it is impossible to speak consistently about Him, and in particular about His relation to the things of this world. And in the face of that fact—the self-contradiction of Theism—it is immaterial how many men have believed in its truth.

(To be continued.)

LOCKE'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

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IN this paper I intend to give no mere summary of what Locke says—what he says, anyone may read for himself—but to give a critical evaluation of what he says, only mentioning his affinities to or divergences from Scholasticism, Cartesianism and Contemporary Thought, in so far as conduces to the better understanding of the “Essay”. Of his influence on subsequent thought as found in Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume and Kant, I will say nothing.

At the very outset we must note that just as Locke finds it impossible to form a positive idea of infinity, because the attempt involves the absurdity of seeking “to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk”, so we will find it impossible to form any one distinct idea of the doctrine of the “Essay”, because it portrays not the result of a process of thought, but that thought advancing.

I. OF LOCKE'S MOTIVE AND AIM IN WRITING THE “ESSAY”.

We will start, then, by stating what were Locke's motive and aim in writing the “Essay”. His motive, he tells us, was the result of a discussion with five or six friends. In this discussion—which, we learn from James Tyrrell,¹ was on the “principles of morality and revealed religion”—difficulties arose “on every side”. And it appeared to Locke that before any conclusion could be come to, an enquiry “into the original certainty and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds of opinion, belief and assent”, should be made. To make such an enquiry is the aim of the “Essay”. In making such an enquiry he wants to combat both scepticism and dogmatism. “He is persuaded that for two evils to which the mind is liable—scepticism, which bids us doubt everything because there are some things which cannot be understood; and, on the other hand, extravagant pretensions to knowledge—there is but one cure, to know how much we can know. The ‘Essay’ is thus a doctrine of the limits of knowledge.”²

¹ J. Gibson: “Locke's Theory of Knowledge”, p. 7.

² S. Alexander: “Locke” (Philosophies Ancient and Modern), p. 26.

Locke sets himself the two problems:

1. Within what range is certain knowledge possible?
2. What are the conditions which justify belief where there is the possibility that such a belief may be erroneous?

The second of these problems is a relatively new one in Locke, having been almost entirely neglected by Descartes, so that it is disappointing when we find that he devotes only one chapter to the subject in Bk. IV. To have done justice to this second problem would have required him to have gone into the whole logic of induction.

The first question, on the other hand, is by no means new, having been discussed with great acuteness and thoroughness by Plato. The same question was central in the Cartesian philosophy. And, since Locke was familiar with Cartesian views, it may be asked why Locke should undertake afresh the investigation of the extent of human knowledge. The reason is that Locke was seriously dissatisfied with Descartes' solution of the problem. Though in one sense a disciple of Descartes, in that he took so much of the Cartesian doctrine for granted, he was also critical of it. For example, though Locke accepted Descartes' definition of an idea, he rejected his doctrine of innate ideas. All knowledge for Locke must be ultimately traceable to the particular data given in experience; the mind itself independent of experience can not be the source of ideas.

The most important divergence between the two philosophers, however, relates to what Locke calls the "extent of knowledge"—knowledge as contrasted with probability. Both agree that mathematics yield knowledge, and both agree in the mechanical view of nature. But whereas Descartes regarded the investigation of natural phenomena as a field in which we could attain certain knowledge, Locke held that physics could yield only probable belief, and could not, owing to our necessary ignorance, be treated as applied mathematics as Descartes had held. But, although as Locke points out, Descartes' method involves a reference to facts and processes not observable by the senses, yet if we can show that what actually does happen does so because of our assumption of what we do not see—what we are necessarily ignorant of according to Locke—then our assumption of that something is justified and we have certainty in physics. And this same method Descartes hoped you could apply to living organisms.

The difference of view between the two philosophers is explained in part, at least, by their different interests. Both

were interested in science, but the science which interested Locke was medicine and chemistry, not physics. His dissatisfaction with the Cartesian method is expressed in the following: "True knowledge grew first in the world by experience and rational observations; but proud man, not content with that knowledge he was capable of, and which was useful to him, would needs penetrate into the hidden causes of things, lay down principles, and establish maxims to himself about the operations of nature, and then vainly expect that nature—or in truth God—should proceed according to those laws which his maxims had prescribed to him. . . . This vanity spread itself into many useful parts of natural philosophy."¹

Such dissatisfaction with the Cartesian theory of knowledge led Locke to make a fresh investigation of the subject. And this was the purpose of the "Essay".

The first topic—the origin of knowledge—is the main question of the first three books. Now this question resolves itself for Locke into the question of the origin of ideas. Since—so Locke's assumption goes—all our knowledge is about ideas, therefore we must have our ideas previous to knowledge, else we would have nothing to know about. And since all our knowledge is about ideas, an investigation of the origin of ideas will be an investigation into the origin of knowledge. So Locke argues, and hence he proceeds to investigate the origin of our ideas.

II. OF IDEAS IN GENERAL.

What does Locke mean by an idea? He means "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. I have used it", he says, "to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking."² Thus we see he uses the word with the comprehensive meaning Descartes attached to it. When he comes to give a list of ideas he includes colours—white, yellow, etc.—noises, tastes, smells, heat, cold, solidity, duration, extension, etc. By all of these ideas he means something which happens within the individual. They are not anything existing in the "real" world. They are only "signs" of that reality. At times these ideas are considered as subjective modifications, and at other times as being an object of the mind distinct both from "reality" on the one hand, and the self on the other. In Locke's treatment "it is implied throughout that ideas possess both aspects. . . . The idea for

¹ Quoted from *De Arte Medica* by A. Campbell Fraser, "Locke" (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics), p. 37.

² "Essay", Bk. I, ch. I, § 8.

him is at once the apprehension of a content and the content apprehended; it is both a psychical existent and a logical meaning.”¹

So much for Locke's meaning of idea. Is his account tenable? Is it the case that when we think the only objects of thought are ideas? When I think of my tobacco, am I really thinking of the tobacco, or an idea of the tobacco? Surely I am thinking of the actual tobacco. That I am doing so is what Locke denies. His doctrine implies that reality can not be present to thought. When I say I have plenty tobacco, do I merely assert that I have an idea that-I-have-plenty-tobacco? Surely not, for my idea that I had plenty tobacco might still exist, though it turned out that I had no tobacco. It was the tobacco to which I referred and not to an idea of it. I did think of reality. What I thought of had an existence distinct from my process of thinking.²

Again, Locke says, that ideas are “copies” of reality. But if these “copies” are the only things present to the understanding, how can you know they are “copies”? To know that a thing is a “copy” you must know the thing of which it is a “copy”.³

This doctrine—“The doctrine of representative knowledge is, in principle, indefensible, because according to it, we begin by apprehending a P [presentation] which represents O [object] without apprehending O itself. But we cannot be aware of P as representative of O without being aware of O itself; and if we are initially aware only of P, there seems to be no conceivable way in which we could pass from the knowledge of P to the knowledge of O.”⁴

Again, if you could be acquainted only with these so-called copies, what would it matter whether there were anything besides them, or not? You could never know the difference, although there was nothing beyond these copies.

Now, since Locke's use of the word idea is unsatisfactory, are we therefore to discard the word altogether? That would be rash. The word can bear a useful meaning. And that meaning is that my idea of a thing is the thing itself, or something else I mistake for it, as it seems to me to be, as it appears to me differently at different periods of my life-history, and which may appear differently to different people. So that my idea of my tobacco is the tobacco itself or something I mistake for it, as it seems to me to be, as it appears

¹ J. Gibson: *Ibid.*, p. 19.

² G. F. Stout: “Mind and Matter”, p. 162, etc.

³ See G. F. Stout: “Studies in Philosophy and Psychology”, p. 369 *et seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 374.

to me differently at different periods in my life-history, and which may appear differently to different people. My idea of my tobacco is my tobacco in so far as I rightly, or wrongly, apprehend it. My idea is no copy, no intermediate object between me and my tobacco. And, if what appears to me as tobacco turns out not to be tobacco, then I appreciate my mistake because I recognize what I took to be tobacco, and what I found was not, as the same. Had I had only two ideas—using idea in Locke's sense of the word—then there would have been no question of being mistaken; my ideas were different ideas and that was all.¹

Locke's view that the only objects of thought are ideas, and that these are not "reality", is thoroughly untenable, and the main question about ideas is not whether they are innate or not, but whether they can exist, and, if so, in what sense.

III. OF LOCKE'S POLEMIC AGAINST INNATE IDEAS.

The mention of innate ideas brings us to a consideration of Locke's polemic against them. Locke attacks the doctrine in its most extreme form, a form in which it was not held by Descartes, or the more intelligent of his followers. By an innate idea Locke meant something which was present to the mind before experience. And he contended, and rightly, that no such thing could exist. But no representative of such a doctrine of explicit innateness can be found. Which fact had led some people to believe that Locke had only set up and overthrown a man of straw. But this does not appear to be the case.² He conceived his argument as primarily directed against the procedure of the schools who held that all knowledge was *ex præcognitis et præconcessis*. This Locke clearly shows is not the case in his chapter "Of Maxims". That all knowledge was derived from such maxims Locke denied, holding that knowledge:

1. Could be obtained without such principles.
2. That it was equally certain without a knowledge of such principles.
3. That such maxims were only the manner according to which we reasoned, not premises from which we deduced conclusions.³

¹ G. F. Stout's reply to Henry Barker's question may be of interest here ("Studies in Philosophy and Psychology", p. 379 *et seqq.*). Also see "Mind and Matter", pp. 199-201, where Stout outlines what he takes to be the residual truth in the Kantian conception of the transcendental object, and pp. 208-209, where he criticizes the Realism of Alexander.

² Cf. J. Gibson, *ibid.*, pp. 39-44.

³ See G. F. Stout, "Mind and Matter", p. 194.

But Locke appears to have considered that his argument was directed against a wider circle than the Schoolmen, and this probably accounts for the "the vaguer and less direct indications in the first book of the opponents he had chiefly in mind".¹ The word "adventitious", as opposed to innate, is used thrice, but it is not to be inferred from this that the argument was primarily directed against Descartes.

What was Locke's motive in opposing innate ideas? I do not agree with Gibson in thinking that, primarily, at least, it was because Locke objected to the mind having knowledge without activity. His main motive may be understood, as Sorley suggests, by his love of liberty in life and thought. He hated anything that savoured of tyranny in any form. And it was because these innate ideas favoured dogmatism that Locke opposed them. His motive comes out in Bk. I, ch. IV, § 24. There he speaks of innate principles as "stopping the enquiry of the doubtful". What else could they do? Were a dispute to arise in which one of the contestants said he was right because of innate ideas, then there was no further room for enquiry. And if once a principle were dubbed innate, then that principle "must not be questioned". You had just to assume an attitude of "blind credulity", and accept it "upon trust". Such an attitude you must not assume, says Locke. You must use your "own reason and judgment". Look to the facts; see how men come by the knowledge of universal truths. You will find them "to result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves, when duly considered". His appeal is to reality, and he is right in making such an appeal. But, then, such a position is not only inconsistent with the doctrine of innate ideas, but with the whole doctrine of ideas, so long as you hold that ideas are not reality.

In criticism of Locke's general position as regards innate ideas it may be said that his argument is not conclusive. It does not follow because we have no ideas before experience that they are therefore derived from experience.² The question of their origin still remains. How could we, for instance, from the particular shapes we experience, arrive at the general conception of shape? How could we arrive at generality from particulars? It is difficult to see how our general idea of shape could either (a) come from a particular datum of sense experience, or (b) be manufactured out of these data.

Locke has his answer to the question—how?—holding that they are due to abstraction from the particulars received in experience. We will criticize this later.

¹ J. Gibson: *Ibid.*, p. 43.

² See G. F. Stout, "Mind and Matter", p. 221.

IV. OF LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE GENESIS OF IDEAS.

Since there are no innate ideas, how do we come by the ideas we have? Locke's answer is: By experience. This experience is of two kinds—Sensation and Reflection. By means of sensation, we receive ideas of sensible qualities—colour, solidity, etc.; by reflection we receive ideas of the operations of our own minds—perception, retention, etc. Whereas the mind is, as it were, turned outward in sensation to external things, in reflection it is, as it were, turned inward upon its own actions. Locke thinks that this latter process has such a resemblance to the former that it might be called an “inner sense”. He does not hold, however, that just as we have no acquaintance with reality beyond our ideas, so we have no acquaintance with the self beyond ideas of it, holding that we have intuitive knowledge of the self.

In justice to Locke it must be said that he showed an awareness of the difficulty of saying that we are acquainted only with ideas derived from sensation and reflection, for under experience he included “suggested by experience”. But Locke's general position is, with the exception just mentioned of “suggested by experience”, that all the ideas we possess are either ideas given in sensation and reflection, or derived from these. Locke's general theory does not make the important distinction made by Professor Stout—the distinction between what is given *in* and what is given *through* actual experience.

From sensation and reflection, Locke holds, we receive simple ideas, by compounding which we get complex ideas, by comparing which we get ideas of relations, and by abstracting from which we get abstract ideas.

Locke's theory is, then, that we start with the simple idea and by a process of composition arrive at complex ideas. The influence of the Baconian type of theory regarding the composition and decomposition of matter is seen in this theory of Locke. Just as a whole of matter was conceived of as being ultimately analysable into its “simple natures” without remainder, and as being nothing but the sum of these simple natures, so all our ideas, if complex, were explicitly avowed by Locke to have been composed of simple ideas, to have been simply the sum of the simple ideas composing it, and to have been capable of analysis into these simple ideas.

When we ask Locke what he means by “simple”, we find that he has two meanings for the term: (a) unanalysable, (b) primary. A simple idea is, according to the first meaning of the word, one which “being in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception

in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas". In this sense an idea is said to be simple when its content is unanalysable. But "it cannot, however, be said that Locke made any serious attempt to apply this criterion, in order to determine the ideas which are to be accepted as simple, or even made clear to himself the precise sense in which this incapacity for analysis is to be understood".¹

The other meaning of the word simple is primary. It is in this sense that extension and duration are held to be simple ideas. They have a claim to be ultimate data of our cognition, but "it is the very nature of both of them to consist of parts". He comes finally to recognize that all simple ideas involve what he calls "secret" relations.

Such, then, is Locke's meaning of simple. From simple ideas it is his contention that we derive all our complex ideas.

V. OF LOCKE'S GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE WAY WE ARRIVE AT IDEAS OTHER THAN SIMPLE.

Having now seen what Locke means by a simple idea, we will proceed to consider how all other ideas are manufactured from these. To prevent us from losing sight of the wood for the trees, we will consider the general assumption which underlies the whole of Locke's treatment. Just as matter was considered to be composed of simple parts, so the simple ideas were considered as the "materials" out of which all complex ideas were compounded. The assumption is that we start with particular ideas, as these are received from sensation and reflection. This assumption is fallacious. We do not start with particulars, or else we would never have general ideas. If we started with particulars, all we could ever attain to would be a collection of particulars. Unless we started with the general idea of shape, we could never arrive at it from particulars. All we could ever obtain would be a collection of particular shapes. The fact is we do not start by recognizing a particular shape as particular, we begin by recognizing it as an example of that sort of thing. We recognize it as belonging to a class of possible things. We recognize it as a determinate under a determinable.

"The knowledge of beings other than existent particulars, e.g., generalities and possibilities, and universal forms of unity, such as space, time and causality, is ultimately coincident with the knowledge of relevant particulars as actually existing. Hence the presentations which present existent particulars *eo ipso* present these other modes of being."²

¹ J. Gibson: *Ibid.*, p. 51.

² G. F. Stout: "Studies in Philosophy and Psychology", pp. 376-377.

Again, if all complex ideas were mere "fictions of the imagination" as Locke maintains, being manufactured out of particular simple ideas, how comes it that we should have the complex ideas we have? How comes it that—to illustrate from an example of Ward—we combine the song with the bird and the perfume with the tree? Why do we not combine the song and the tree? Locke replies that our ideas are only "real" in so far as they correspond to reality. But has Locke any right to make such a reply? In the first place, according to him, we are aware only of our ideas, and, secondly, all these ideas are particular simple ideas, and only become complex by the work of the mind on them. Locke has no right to make such a reply, if he is to be consistent, and still hold that such combinations of simple ideas are simply due to the mind. Of course, Locke realizes that we do unite the song with the bird, and the perfume with the tree, although if they were considered as mere ideas, then there is no reason why one should not be combined with any of the others. Locke appeals to reality and in doing so abandons his original position. Complex ideas are not simply "fictions of the imagination". We find colour, hardness, extension, etc., all united from the first in, say, an apple. We do not start with a particular idea of colour, a particular idea of hardness, etc., and then arbitrarily combine all these to form the complex idea of an apple. We start with these properties combined, and recognize them as all belonging to the same thing. In any case, if the different properties and all other properties only reach us as particulars, how can we ever think of combining them? To have thought of forming a complex idea, we must have started with the general idea of combination. We could not have formed the complex idea of a centaur—which, according to Locke, is a fictitious idea, having no counterpart in reality—unless we had the general idea of combination of parts. Now it is from reality that we get our general idea of composition. We apprehend things as combined and apprehend these combinations as examples of the general idea of combination.

Locke's appeal is to reality, then. Our complex ideas are only real in so far as the simple ideas are found together in reality. But even this criterion is not enough. The song of the bird and the smell of the tree were found together. Yet Locke would not have combined the two. Why? He would again have appealed to reality and have said that they were not always found together. Of course, this appeal to reality is contrary to his primal assumptions.

Again, even supposing we grant Locke that we do combine our simple ideas in such-and-such a way, because they are found to be so combined in reality—even granting him this—what account is he to give of causation, where we are not concerned with discrete substances, but the nature of different substances, and their relation to, and effect on, one another? Now, it was the assumption of Locke that all substances in “reality” were discrete, and all the properties which they manifested were due to their own individual essence. The apple which shows itself as coloured and feels hard, etc., does so because of a certain disposition of minute particles within it. When we ask how we come to feel it hard, his answer is because it affects our senses in such-and-such a way. He conceives the essence of the apple as being active and himself as being passive in receiving certain sensations from it. You have on the one side an active power, and on the other side an inactive recipient. The one is the cause and the other is that in which the effect is produced. This conception of cause and effect, as put forward by Locke, is fundamentally false. “The causal relation . . . cannot subsist between otherwise loose and separate items.”¹ When I look at an apple and have a sensation of red, I am as much an essential part of the cause of that sensation red as the apple is. Were I colour blind I would not have the same sensation. And not only are the apple and I causes of the sensation red, not only have the apple and I to be in a certain relation to one another as regards distance, but certain light rays have to be present, which are themselves dependent upon some cause, which is itself dependent on something else, and so on *ad infinitum*. The cause can not be considered as any self-contained somewhat. To take substances as discrete entities of which some are active and others passive is entirely fallacious. We must recognize that all things including ourselves belong to a system within which they interact upon one another.² Now Locke did come to hold this position, that all substances are not particular discrete entities, but interrelated within a system. But this was contrary to the rest of his doctrine. He did come to realize that not only were

¹ G. F. Stout: “Mind and Matter”, p. 121.

² See G. F. Stout, “Mind and Matter”, pp. 283-285, where, *inter alia*, he criticizes Hume’s account of what happens when the motion of one billiard ball is followed by the motion of another. On page 285 we read: “The interaction between them [i.e., the billiard balls] and what follows it, occur as developments of the whole spatio-temporal situation and of the tendencies inherent in it, reinforcing or counteracting or otherwise modifying each other. Further, the whole situation cannot be confined to the billiard table and the balls. This is only a partial extract from a more comprehensive spatio-temporal and causal unity. If we posit a self-contained unity this can only be found, if at all, in the concept of the self-contained universe of being which includes all that is.”

our simple sensations given together in certain complexes because of a certain constitution of parts in discrete substances, but that the substances themselves were all united within a whole, ". . . and the great parts and wheels, as I may so say, of this stupendous structure of the universe, may, for ought we know, have such a connection and dependence in their influences and operations one upon another, that perhaps things in this our mansion would put on quite another face, and cease to be what they are, if some one of the stars, or great bodies incomprehensibly remote from us, should cease to be or move as it does".¹

We in the long run find Locke abandoning his view that we are only acquainted with ideas, and that these, if simple, are combined in, it would seem, a mechanical and arbitrary way to form complex ideas, and that all substances are discrete. But he rather surreptitiously brings in his new doctrine. He never went back on his first assumptions and rejected them as untenable. To use Professor Stout's phrase, he "tries to cut the knot instead of untying it".²

VI. OF COMPOUNDING, COMPARING AND ABSTRACTING.

In distinction from our simple ideas, all other ideas are spoken of as in some sense "the work of the mind". That is, that while the mind is passive in receiving simple ideas, it is active in forming complex ideas. As we have seen these complex ideas are not formed arbitrarily but with reference to reality, although the mere existence of a complex idea is no evidence that the same combination of elements has ever been found together in experience, and even when, as we have seen, presented together, it is no guarantee of their forming a complex idea. In order that they should form a complex idea the mind has to exercise its "power to consider several of them as united together in one idea".

Complex ideas are formed by (a) compounding, (b) comparing, (c) abstracting.

As regards "complex", let us note here before we proceed that when we include ideas from comparison and abstraction under complex, we are using complex in the sense of "secondary" as opposed to "primary" or "original" ideas.

(a) *Compounding*.—Little need be said here. The process has been fairly clearly stated already in connection with Locke's general procedure in Bk. II. He says it is that operation of the mind "whereby it puts together several of those simple

¹ "Essay", Bk. IV, ch. VI, § 11.

² "Mind and Matter", p. 162, n.

ones it has received from sensation and reflection and combines them into complex ones".

Even with regard to complex ideas which are so formed, it is evident that the composition theory, strictly interpreted, breaks down, for it can not account for the unity involved in the complex whole. That complex whole is not analysable without remainder into its parts. But the breakdown of the composition theory becomes even more conspicuous, when we realize that compounding is not the only operation which gives rise to complex ideas, there being as well the processes of comparing and abstracting. "When he—Locke—comes to deal with the actual nature of our secondary, or 'complex' ideas, the inadequacy of the composition theory at once shows itself, and its presuppositions are abandoned still more completely than was the requirement of an absolute simplicity in the simple idea. For, in addition to its power of compounding, the mind is declared to possess powers of comparing and abstracting, the products of which can not be represented as mere complexes due to composition of elements."¹

(b) *Comparing*.—Locke says that comparing ideas "in respect of extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circumstances, is another operation of the mind about its ideas, and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas comprehended under relation". These ideas which are compared may be either simple or complex, and the comparing consists "in setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one".² So we note (a) that when we compare two ideas we arrive at an idea of a relation which was not in either of the ideas; we start, as it were, with two ideas, and end with three; (b) that comparing, as opposed to compounding, consists in setting two ideas side by side and taking a view of both at once, without uniting them into one.

(*To be continued.*)

¹ J. Gibson: *Ibid.*, p. 64.

² "Essay", Bk. II, ch. XII, § 1.

FACT AND IDEAL IN POLITICAL THEORY.

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THERE are two main ways of reflecting on the facts of political life. The first is that of empirical science. The inquirer tries to discover certain general laws which will reduce to a simple economical formula observed forms of social behaviour. This work is done in detail by the economist, the statistician, the social psychologist, and the student of comparative institutions. "Political science" is perhaps the best general description of it. It suffers as a science from the fact that individual differences are far wider and more significant in the field which it studies than they are in the field of any other science: but it can formulate useful generalizations concerning the normal sequence of events in social life. It is at least thoroughly scientific in being interested in the way things *do* happen rather than in the way they *ought* to happen.

This kind of inquiry, however, does not satisfy our curiosity in the matter of social behaviour. There are, it is true, certain questions which it can answer without raising other questions which it cannot answer. It can estimate the influence of the motor-car on social habit without either applauding or regretting it. But sooner or later we are bound to inquire whether the reaction thus discovered is or is not consonant with the ends of human nature. The most objective inquirer must face the problem of value; and as soon as he does so he becomes a philosopher. For whenever the thinker finds himself talking about meaning, or the moralist about obligation, he passes from the derivative to the original, from the actual to the real, from the sphere of science to that of philosophy.

The best way, therefore, to introduce a philosophy of politics is to raise at once the problem of political obligation. This problem is not "Why *do* people obey the state?", nor yet "Why do people *think they ought* to obey the state?". These are exercises in what Kant called the anthropology of morals, and belong to the sphere of political science. It is rather "Why *ought* people to obey the state?",¹ with the proviso, of course,

¹This is a less ambiguous way of asking the question than "What is the real nature of the state?", though for me it means the same thing. It brings out the gap between the real and the historical which I should wish to imply, but which is not implied in everyone's conception of the "real".

that there may be no reason at all, or that such reasons as there are may be limited and conditional.

Now merely to draw this distinction, and merely to ask the final question, is to imply that the state exists to fulfil a purpose other than the mere will of its rulers. There will, it is true, be varying interpretations of the end which the state is to accomplish: as many, in fact, as there are views about morality. There have been worldly and cynical philosophies which defend obedience on grounds of utility or self-interest. There have been idealistic philosophies which stress the contribution of law and order to the free life of the spirit, in religion, in art, in intellectual pursuits, and in the exercise of private morality. But in the first case, equally with the second, the organization of men in the state is regarded as a means to an end. Organization as such, whether coercive or facilitative, has no claim on our allegiance: it is, in fact, an empty form till we know what is going to be done with it.

Accordingly, the philosophy of politics, like the philosophy of morals, is teleological rather than analytic in its methods; it reviews politics in the light of the ends which they serve. This appears most clearly in the case of philosophies which interpret political obligation in terms of ideals. Utilitarian philosophies, whether of appetition, like Bentham's, or of avoidance, like Hobbes's, could consistently hold that what men really want can be procured for them by the state. For the idealist the condition of affairs which the state can produce is only the starting-point from which he must proceed to his goal by his own efforts. It is clear that the Utilitarian, the man whose standards are those of his physical existence, will owe more to an organization which ministers effectively to him than will the saint or artist or philosopher or moralist: not that the service is greater, but rather that the sphere of that service covers a larger part of his life. It is to the less equivocal case that we shall restrict the argument: especially as the Utilitarian has fallen into the confusion, which it is the object of this paper to expose, between the ends of the organism and the ends of the spirit.

Our view, then, asserts that the purpose of political organization lies in its conduciveness to the life which people really want to live, and that its mediating function is most obvious in those cases where the life which people really want to live is one which they will have to live for themselves. This is little more than Green's doctrine that the function of the state is to be a "hindrance of hindrances to the good life", though we ought, in deference to our recent experience

of the "public service" state, to include the facilitating of facilities. But it is inconsistent with the doctrine of a General Will in which Green mysteriously merges it, for it implies that the state is in no sense the real source of moral authority. As that much more advanced believer in the absolute state, Bosanquet, remarked in one of those welcome moments when his conspicuous humanity was too much for his German metaphysics, the compulsion of the state "can only be justified if it liberates resources of character and intelligence greater beyond all question than the encroachment which it involves".¹ That is to say, the state is answerable to moral criticism, and is based on the intrinsic importance of spiritual freedom.

This does not mean that wherever spiritual freedom conflicts with organization it is a duty to rebel, or even to resist. In so far as the organization is required to maintain the external conditions of spiritual freedom, it has indirectly a moral claim on us: and the practical decision as to how to act in the resultant clash of duties is no business of political philosophy. There is certainly no justification for protesting against limitations on one's own freedom without reference to their effect on others: the expanded intellectual horizon of the Russian worker, for example, may be worth the temporary enslavement of the Russian universities to a political dogma.

Moreover, the theory that the state is morally responsible to standards based on personal freedom may acknowledge and even stress the importance of the state as a *condition* of the good life. There is no other body which could ever be capable of administering even justice, or providing efficient public services, for a whole community. Even when it fails, or does not try, it remains true that it alone *could* succeed if it *did* try. It has certain irreplaceable functions to perform, and there would be no amenities, no security, and no social life without it. In view of what is to follow, this cannot be stated too strongly. But there is a difference between the end to be attained and the means of attaining it, however indispensable the means may be. The state is concerned with the external manipulation of men.² It thinks, and in virtue of its function it is right to think, in terms of law and compulsion and organization and institutions: in short, in terms of an abstract universality. But the paradox of it is that the end

¹ "Philosophical Theory of the State", 3rd ed., pp. 178-179.

² As the state becomes more and more concerned with direct service to individuals, this assertion needs qualifying. A teacher in a state school, or a probation officer, is not concerned with the "external manipulation of men". But, as an organ of law, the state is satisfied if the law is not broken: and even in its public services the state usually provides for classes or instances of men rather than for individuals.

which it is its function to secure is of precisely the opposite character: it is free spiritual activity: it is art and philosophy and science and religion: it is the untrammelled working of moral obligation between man and man: it is the concrete universality which recreates itself at every moment through criticism, discussion, and mutual agreement or forbearance.

Such is the doctrine of the state which is most naturally foreshadowed in the search for the source of political obligation. Yet political theories which have begun in this way have sometimes gone on to find their solution in the superior ethical nature of the state itself. The inquiry, "Why should I obey the state?", is answered, not by saying that the state is the condition of free spiritual activity, but by asserting that it is the centre and inspiration of all free spiritual activity. It leads to the doctrine of the Ethical State.

According to this view, politics are not an introduction to morals, they are the source of morals: organization is not a prop for the spontaneity which outgrows it, it is the limit beyond which spontaneity must not go. In its more sophisticated forms it even claims that spontaneity grows to a higher level through such limitation. In its cruder forms it proclaims a sharp antagonism, and calls all spontaneity vicious unless it advocates an established political idolatry. In all its forms it sets up the state as the concentration and the end of all that occurs within it. It solves the problem of political obligation, not by showing that the activities of politics minister to the spirit, but by defining the spirit itself as an organ of the state.¹

The theory is comparatively speaking a new one. In practice spontaneity has constantly been violated, perhaps more brutally in the past than it is even today: but the violator rarely made a theory or an ideal of his brutality. Political theorists themselves have more than once exalted political above moral standards. But they have usually proceeded as cynics rather than as idealists. Machiavelli advised his Prince to ignore morality, but he did not tell him that in so doing he would be acting morally. Hobbes would appear to come closer to the modern position, for he does say that there is no obligation to refrain from any action except such as the sovereign forbids by law. But even Hobbes, in the long run, regards the state as an instrument to serve the true ends of the individual, and to be justified on that account: so that what we have to deplore in him is not his view of the relation

¹ The word "spirit" is used to denote human nature in so far as it is linked by aspiration to standards or ideals.

between individual and social ends, but his view of what individual ends actually are.

Very different, and yet similar in that it subordinates ethics to politics without ethically exalting the state, is the recent theory of the French sociologists. Their view is shortly that governments and all institutions are essentially social facts rather than responses to conceptions of right. They are organs of a social collectivity in which each part is adapted by historical experience to the others. As organs, they exist to serve society as a whole, but they have no responsibility to individuals. On this view the state is not an ethical entity; but then it ignores morality altogether. It represents a confusion, brought about by a metaphysical naturalism, between political science and political philosophy. As it stops short where the interest of political philosophy begins, we need not consider it further.

In contrast to all these views stands the view which traces back to Fichte and Hegel, and inspires the modern totalitarian state: the view which subordinates ethics to politics on the ground that the life of the state is morally superior to that of the individual: the view according to which value is concentrated in institutions. It is not the object of this study to describe the different forms of this belief, but rather to examine the assumptions leading to its affirmation. It should, however, be noted that in its modern forms it bases itself less on the mere authority of the state, and more on the structural cohesion of the community. National sentiment, and an active participation in the national policy, are required, in place of mere obedience.

There are several stock arguments urged on behalf of this position which are plainly true in themselves, though they prove what they are meant to prove only with the help of certain false assumptions. In the first place, a contrast can be drawn between the continuity of life in a community and the evanescence of the individual, who flits across its surface and departs. "The nation . . . is an organism embracing an indefinite series of generations in which each individual is but a transient element."¹ Whatever may be thought of the quasi-metaphysical formulation, the fact is true enough. States do last longer than individuals, and their long-range stability is important for all the purposes which individuals may desire to express. The question is whether human ideals can really be summed up in terms of duration combined with efficiency.

¹This is from the original programme of the National Fascist Party of Italy (Dec., 1921), and is quoted by Ivor Brown, "The Meaning of Democracy", p. 156.

Secondly, there is the obvious fact that the individual does not exist except in a community. He is born, reared, and educated in a community: he is saturated with its traditions: he expresses in his doings a characteristic outlook, produced by a communal example and training. Any political theory which starts with abstract isolated individuals is in clear conflict with facts. But the question is whether ideals which spring out of a common psychological background ought necessarily to redirect themselves to it as an object of aspiration.

Thirdly, however, it will be urged that each man is functionally a fragment of a community, as each man's contribution presumes a complementary contribution on the part of others. This is not true only of economic function: it is true of morality itself. It is the substance of each man's duty to do, not what is demanded of man in general, but what is demanded of him individually, according to the peculiarities of his nature: the universality of human experience being reconstituted through the social integration of differences. Again the statement contains a large element of truth, but again it leaves a question behind it. Admitting that a society must be constituted by interchange of function, and that different men have different duties (though this latter statement needs refining), is the ideal worth of a man's action proportionate to its value in a functional society?

It will be noted that in all these cases the reply to the question, "Why should we obey the state?", is given not in terms of what we ought to be, but in terms of what we are: not in terms of means and end, but in terms of part and whole.¹ This point is central, and we shall return to it. But the more obvious criticism of the theory before us is that states and majorities have often been shown to be wrong, not only tactically but ethically. How then can it be said to be everyone's duty, without examination, to live "in conformity with the ethos of his own people"?² And how can the political theorist who contemplates such happenings maintain that the actual and the ideal are one?

The answer to such questions has often been that in the face of a national crisis one cannot afford to be ethically particular, or that strength is beautiful, and the moral independence which thwarts it ugly. The difficulty here is the idealizing of natural inclinations, and it indicates a

¹ The objection may be raised that this distinction removes the activities of the spirit from the sphere of logic. Actually it only demands the recognition within the field of general logic of sub-categories applicable to different levels of creation. What happens only too often is that logic as a whole is identified with one or another of these sub-categories. This is the reason for the anti-intellectualist revolt in philosophy.

² Hegel, "Philosophy of Right", Dyde's translation, p. 240.

serious lapse of moral insight. But it is possible to put up a defence of state absolutism without such back-sliding, with the aid of a providential philosophy of history.

The difficulty which has to be faced is that particular states are often and obviously defective. But if they are states at all, they must to that extent at least perform the function in human life for which they exist. And if the defects can be shown to be incidental to the growth of that perfect State, which is in some degree immanent in all actual states, then it is possible to reply to the moral objector that the historical process cannot happen all at once: that the actual states which he condemns are a preparation for the ideals which he too impatiently asserts against them: that they are the best that is possible at the time, and therefore deserve all the respect due to the ideal: and that any ideal which is turned against them is self-contradictory. Moral protest is a sign of speculative shallowness. At and for any given moment the ideal is nowhere if not in the actual.

The metaphysical background of this theory is German romantic pantheism, marshalled and systematized by the Hegelian dialectic. All is one and one is all: the real is the rational and the rational is the real: all experience is a devolution of the Absolute experience, and its closeness to reality can be measured by its approximation to unity. The principle of unity in the practical affairs of man is the state, which is thus the natural intermediary in the downward logical march of reason. It is also the guiding factor in the upward historical march of reason, and its goal is the perfect freedom of unity in difference.

History, then, is a fore-ordained process, through which reason, incorporating all opposition, returns to its own seamless perfection. Hence, though it happens *through* the agency of individuals, it does not happen *because of* the agency of individuals. What a man thinks, unless it conforms to the spirit of his people and his times, is a vain imagining which history passes by, and is therefore of no value. And states cannot be ethically estimated, for the only possible standard is their own immanent principle.

This providential view of history has its difficulties. In the first place, any event may be made to look providential afterwards, however open the issue may have been beforehand. The defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo gave rise to a number of historical consequences, together with which it forms an unbroken series of causes and effects. Looking back on the process, historians may discover at the terminal point of their period a meaning in it, unknown to the actors in it, in the

light of which Waterloo appears as an inevitable link in it. Waterloo seems to be demanded by the course of history. But if the result had been reversed, it would still have been demanded by the course of history: and as we can look behind the scenes, we know that it might have been reversed. A second-rate commander, unsure of his position, refused good advice by way of asserting his authority, and failed to bring Napoleon the reinforcements with the help of which he might have won. But for Marshal Grouchy's inhibitions, Providence might have had to look in the other direction.

Still, taking historical movements as a whole, so many things have happened that nobody intended that it seems plausible to think of a grand process on the one hand and unseeing puppets on the other. It is true that nobody can foresee all consequences, and that in all serious matters there is a gap between intention and event. But there is a difference between partial and total blindness, and that difference is the measure of individual freedom. The influence of the individual on history depends on the extent to which his idealism is linked with knowledge and practical ability, and on the capacity of different individuals to combine for a common purpose instead of leaving the issue to the clash of conflicting wills.¹ And if more than one result is possible at any given time, it seems impossible to maintain the providential view of history, except in an empirical and statistical sense. Providence will be seen to be what it has always been for the highest religious minds: an assurance for each rather than a programme for all.

This conclusion is of some importance to our theme, for without its theory of history the philosophy of the absolute state is forced into the extreme position of asserting the supreme moral authority of the state without the mitigating assurance that the state itself is part of a wider, and morally satisfying, order. It further indicates the difficulty of combining a recognition of human freedom with a monistic rationalism, and suggests a suspicion that the categories of whole and part belong to a level of experience lower than that of human idealism. But even if the outcome of history were a providential freedom, it would still remain to be asked whether the intrinsic value of a life or an action is to

¹ This point is admirably brought out by Dr. A. D. Lindsay, in "Karl Marx's 'Capital'", where he shows how the theory of economic determinism is true only of a period of unrestricted competition, in which social results necessarily fail to correspond with the purposes of individuals.

be determined by its situation in a historical process.¹ It is at least conceivable that while it produces consequences in the historical process its value is to be estimated not by its consequences, but by its nature. It may be teleological, not in the cheap modern sense of seeking an end in time (which, for all the absolutist's juggling with time and eternity, can never be other than a finite end), but in the high Greek sense of approximating to a rational ideal. It is not suggested that lives and actions which have value do not have historical consequences, or even that their having historical consequences does not in some sense enhance their value. It is simply meant that the historical order does not exhaust value: that as history advances some element of value is always left behind.

In some cases it is possible to argue that objects which have been historically annihilated must have possessed value. Sophocles wrote 132 plays, of which 7 survive; but from what we know of Sophocles as an artist we can be perfectly sure of a certain æsthetic value in the remaining 125, and we should be just as sure of it even if nobody had ever seen them. The æsthetic effect of the actor's magic fades with the moment, and perishes with a generation: not so its æsthetic value. Caruso is not greater than Roscius because his gramophone records will inspire posterity. The heroic failures of history, which, in Bosanquet's almost farcical phrase, have "qualified the Absolute by a significant negation", cannot decently be pronounced less valuable than its vulgar successes. The Lollards, the Levellers, the Chartist, were dispersed by physical force, and history does not record the high enthusiasm and self-sacrifice of their nameless rank and file. It came to nothing: and even where it had later repercussions it must be written down as a defeat of the spirit, however inevitable and however fruitful. There are the still humbler graces and splendours of private life, which most of us know and value, but which in a short time no one will remember. Everyone who has any experience of valuing must value this fine wastage: and if history cannot do so too, history is a bad judge of value.

But, it will be urged, valuable actions which lead to valuable results are more valuable than those which do not. This is true, in the sense that intrinsic value plus a further

¹ This point may be stated both positively and negatively. Positively it means that however valuable an action may be in producing a historical result, its authentic value, if it is authentically valuable, lies in itself and not in its historical results. This is the way the argument proceeds in the text. But it may be made clearer by being stated in the negative form, that if a providential result is accomplished at the expense of frustration and evil, the result does not cancel the disvalue in the process by which it is achieved. Disvalue also lies in itself, and not in its historical results. This is why it cannot be explained away as a "negative moment".

instrumental value is more valuable than intrinsic value alone. But this is only because the instrumental value conduces to more intrinsic value, which once again escapes subordination to history. Again, it will be argued that that which is valuable in itself may be historically dependent on previous expressions of value. True, but it depends on them for its existence, not for its value. Finally, is not the historical embodiment of value itself valuable? Quite so, but in itself, and not for its consequences: unless, as argued above, these take the form of values which are intrinsic.

The reason why this is not noticed is that the intention of the agent is always directed to the future. The *field* of his action is historical. But the moral flavour of the action, which it is the business of the moral philosopher to assess, stands out as a super-eminent quality from the practical conjunction of datum and intention in the action: and even the intention, though directed, as we said, to the future, is guided, in its plans for the reshaping of the future, not only by its recognition of fact, but also by the standards in the light of which it wishes to change fact. Such standards, to be made effective, must be welded with fact by a high degree of practical sagacity, and arise psychologically from a contemplation of fact, but their authority over fact they draw from their own nature. If this were not the case, we should be committed to estimating moral conduct by non-moral criteria, and we should be involved in a vicious regress, extending endlessly into the future in pursuit of a sanction which the future cannot supply.

It should now be clear that human values are not determinable by any historical dialectic, and that all philosophies of history which automatically justify successive phases of the actual as successive phases of the Ideal in action are therefore in error. But, deprived of its philosophy of history, the Absolutist theory of the state has to choose between the candid immoralism of Machiavelli or Hobbes and the moral exaltation of the things which the state stands for as against the claims of individual aspiration. As candour goes with a capacity for making clear distinctions, the pantheist who believes in immanent ideals usually prefers the second alternative. Thus it is that he comes to defend the ethico-totalitarian state.

The claim for the moral supremacy of the state depends on one of two confusions, each of them due to an implicit naturalism. The first is that we may think something to be intrinsically valuable when in fact it is only historically, or contingently, valuable. The fault here is one of moral

insight, and consists of mistaking the means for the end. The second is that while directing our attention to what is really and intrinsically valuable we may spoil our understanding of it by applying to it categories of thought proper only to the contingently valuable. The fault here is one of philosophical insight, and arises from a false assimilation of the spiritual to the natural. The result is the same in both cases, but as the road traversed is different, each will be taken separately.

There is a common tendency to fasten on the accidents of nature which form the *background* of our aspirations, and to idealize them, making them *objects* of aspiration. Psychologically, this is probably due to their entry into the system of the self-regarding sentiment. A good many people are proud of their physical type. It has probably little to do with morality and intelligence, and in any case it would be the defect of these qualities, rather than any associated type, which would give ground for a negative judgment of value. Yet physical type is a frequent pretext for self-adulatory soliloquy, and we end by admiring it wherever it appears, as if it had ideal instead of merely factual significance.

In the same way, it is a fact about each of us that he belongs to a certain country. He is rooted to it by race and interest, and also, through education, by a common mentality. To serve it is often the summit of his idealism. Yet this object of his aspiration is really a background, out of which aspirations naturally spring. The background is worth preserving, because aspiration springs most genuinely from a familiar soil. But when it is raised to the rank of an ideal, it tends to treat as superfluous, and even as dangerous, the genuine ideals which it supplants.

It will be replied that ideals are based on facts, and that a national background, for example, colours the idealism of any particular people. This is true, but it does not affect the argument. There is, in fact, more native Englishry of spirit in the internationally minded English working man than in the Englishman of cosmopolitan habits but narrowly national sentiments living abroad to escape his country's taxation. Everything he does is extremely English, but he does not do it because it is English. This is nationalism in its proper place, and all attempts to force his mentality into a foreign mould would be justly condemned. And, as a matter of fact, it is usually through some such interference that a normal fact of environment acquires the glamour of an ideal. But to set the pseudo-ideal thus conceived above the claims of artistic and intellectual integrity, or above the common duties of man to man, is clearly to invert means and ends. In a

perfect economy of the human spirit, both nature and nurture point beyond themselves to the completely personal and completely disinterested endeavours of the artist, the thinker, and the saint.

Much the same applies to the idealization of the biological virtues of force and efficiency. A certain type of imagination, regrettably common in Germany since the time of Nietzsche and Wagner, does seem to gain rhapsodic inspiration from the contemplation of sheer strength and size. As a matter of fact, these are not even biological virtues without qualification, as the megatherium discovered when it found itself survived by the mouse: but they appeal as such, and in the name of conquest or survival they are morally enthroned above poise and reason. Their preposterous elevation is most charitably explained as a reaction against unpractical idealism and national humiliation: the temple of the spirit too often falls for want of scaffolding, and the prosaic builder thereof must keep pace with the ardour of the decorative artist. But the heroic strength admired by the German (as also its more equitable English brother, administrative efficiency) is properly speaking no more than a way of carrying out whatever purposes men may have in mind, and everything depends on what those purposes are. It is the choice of ideals which is decisive in the end, and to idealize strength and efficiency is simply to offer to the subordinate biological aspect of our existence the homage due to the spiritual.

This idealization of facts and means plays no small part in determining the practical attitude of the ethico-totalitarian state. But it is too crude to explain the position of its genuinely philosophical advocates. In reading Hegel, for example, we cannot fail to be impressed by the authenticity of his spiritual insight: and this is nowhere more evident than in his aphorisms on religion. Yet in his "Philosophy of History" he subjects religion to a standard of social conformity.¹ It is not lack of spiritual appreciation which is the trouble. It is rather the manner of interpreting what is appreciated. Categories of thought are employed which are inappropriate to the understanding of the spirit and its ideals. The foremost among these are *organicity* and *function*.

It is true that in every society there is interchange of function and the resultant totality can not unfairly be com-

¹ "Religion is the sphere in which a nation gives itself the definition of that which it regards as the True" (Sibree's translation, p. 52; italics mine). It is true that Hegel, unlike some of his more reckless self-constituted disciples, regards community of religion as one of the formative influences in a state, so that the state is in one sense at least dependent on religion. But he seems unable, as long as he is talking about history, to see religion except as a social phenomenon.

pared, in regard to the relation of the parts to the whole, to a biological organism. But at this point two questions arise. The first has been raised already in the course of our statement of the traditional arguments for the absolute state: how much, and what aspect, of a person's life is expressed through the function in virtue of which he is "organically" linked to others? The second, suggested by the whole trend of our discussion, but here explicitly raised for the first time, is whether any function can be properly performed if it is performed simply as a function, without drawing upon an inner personal life which lies behind the function and gives its value to the function.

It would be less than just to say that the functional aspect of personality is limited to the sphere of material needs. As Plato showed in the *Republic*, division of labour in the economic sense is only the beginning of a functional society. The clergyman, the teacher and the artist have, in virtue of their specific natures and callings, a social function to perform. Nor is it true that the performance of function excludes ideal spontaneity. On the contrary, it carries with it a vital enhancement, even when it is uncongenial, as in the case of an unemployed worker who returns to inferior employment; and it may engender the utmost enthusiasm, as in the case of patriotic service in war-time. Nor again is it irrelevant to the highest welfare of the individual that he should perform his function properly. Whatever else he may have to do, this at least is to his credit.

But, for all that, there are elements in personal life which cannot be subjected to a functional interpretation. The assumption behind the idea of function is that of a single unifying social trend which alone gives meaning to all that men may do: so that when a person does something which is not his function, he is doing something which he ought not to do, and which, in the longest and truest view, derogates from his personality. This is contrary to evident experience. It is not the function of the working man to be a student, but he may be a very good student, and may even feel that he is most himself when, in his spare time, he is a student. And if it is argued that in a proper functional society he would have been a student if he had the capacity, we may raise the question of hobbies. It is not my function to be a gardener, and I am not a good gardener, and in a functional state I should not be allowed to be a gardener: but, as a person, I feel all the better for trying to be a gardener. Is a person never to do anything at all unless he can do it as well as the expert? And, to translate this general question into

specifically political language, must a person take no critical interest in politics unless he is actually a political administrator? On the contrary, the command to bury one's lesser talents is an offence to the balance and rhythm of personality, and if the functional state insists on it, as it should do if it is to be consistent, then personality cannot be limited by the functional state.¹

We may put the same point in another way by saying that a man is not simply a function, nor even a series of functions, but a bearer or exerciser of functions. Neglect of this point is the defect of all theories of vocational representation. They hold that a man should contribute to political life in terms of his technical experience, rather than as a complete personality: forgetting that law is explicitly concerned with everybody, without reference to function, and that an aggregation of deliberately restricted views is unlikely to produce political judgment. The logical conclusion of all such doctrines is Fascist and anti-democratic, for Fascism does not ask the technicians to pronounce on anything more than their technology, and leaves politics to the leader, as an incarnation of the national genius. The merging of the person in the group leads naturally enough to his merging in the state.

The conclusion is that the concept of function is applicable, primarily to associations of men directed towards mere physical survival or aggrandisement, and derivatively to the relations between those whose concern is power or welfare on the one hand, and the professional exponents of spiritual culture on the other, in a more developed community, but not at all to spiritual activity as such. Man, who even in his highest and most truly human capacity is a member of a functional society, is, in virtue of that same capacity, also a member of what Kant called a "kingdom of ends". As such he has more than the merely moral obligations which Kant assigned to him: he has duties of intellectual and artistic integrity, which have nothing whatever to do with the state, except that they must be weighed against the duties owed to the state as the source of social security. But he has also moral duties to his fellows as such, which mobs and majorities and totalitarian communities are just as likely to denounce as was the lawless legendary tyrant in Sophocles's *Antigone*,

¹ It is often not wholly consistent. There are many activities which the state may regard as irrelevant to function. Religion in its more private and mystical forms may be disregarded, as having no direct bearing on social life. So with matters of private taste and fashion. But it is the tendency of the functional state to insist that anything which is done in the state shall be done to the glory of the state. The position of sport in contemporary Germany is a good example.

and which his spiritual loyalties demand that he should observe at any material cost. It is a sure mark of atavistic barbarism when men capable of moral integrity allow it to be submerged in a blind sentiment of solidarity. And it is a still surer mark of it when states themselves throw over the principle of personal justice, and allow rewards and penalties to be determined in their courts purely by considerations of political consequence.¹ Such men, whether individually or collectively, have forgotten their birthright, and elected to abide with the whole potency of their spiritual natures in a horrible circular kingdom of means.

But not only does spiritual loyalty transcend social function: it also conditions social function. This is particularly clear in the case of the thinker and the artist. They can do their best work for the community if they have no thought of the community while they are doing it. A work of art must above all things be sincere, and when forced into an uncongenial mould it becomes dull and didactic like the Bolshevik novels which prefer tractors and factories to a suspicious bourgeois relic like individual human nature. Even when the artist takes to propaganda with spontaneous enthusiasm, he is sacrificing his artistic insight to become an inferior sociologist or theologian.² The thinker cannot think unless he is prepared to damn the consequences. Unless he has the freedom to say what is unpopular, treasonable or blasphemous if he really believes it, he cannot do for others what is expected of a thinker, namely, to discover the truth and to inspire others to discover more of it. The same is true of the moralist: he can do his duty by others only if he retains his own integrity, and if he surrenders it in the fancied public interest he sacrifices his own contribution for a stupid imitation of what is at the best an inferior form of service.

Indeed, the organic analogy has seriously corrupted our view of personal relations. We value others in terms of their social utility, in terms of their service to us, or of our service to them, in terms of efficiency, in terms of political or religious compatibility, in terms of weakly grounded preferences and affections, in terms of anything but real friendship. Real friendship gives and receives, but not for the sake of giving and receiving. It arises between men and women whose spiritual lives are strong enough to overflow with joy and gratitude

¹ This is a strong tendency in all absolutist states. Both Russia and Germany offer a regrettably large number of examples: and in both countries the practice is theoretically justified.

² Compare the sad fate of a great novelist in Mr. H. G. Wells. There is such a thing as good art which is also good propaganda. But this only happens when the artist retains his austere integrity and illuminates instead of instructing.

in social life. It combines the splendid Stoic sense of personal dignity with Christian humility and charity, and, rising beyond the introductory phase of superficial interest or attraction, pierces to the inmost depth and intensity of being, where the free man dwells in spite of history and circumstance.

But our problem is, why do men of considerable spiritual insight maintain the subordination of the spirit to the state? As far as the non-philosopher is concerned, something must be attributed to the preoccupation of the administrator with practical problems. It is all very well, he may say, to rant apocalyptically about friendship, but how is the basic unity of the actual state to be maintained in a crisis of conflicting interests? May not the assertion of the state's right to absorb all loyalties be necessary if the state is to uphold the conditions to which we ourselves attribute at least a hypothetical moral value? This plea is not without foundation, though as administrators are apt to make it when there is no case for it, it should be carefully scrutinized. But even so what we have to do is to choose which loyalty to stand by: and if we choose to stand out and take the consequences, it ought not to be said that we are false to ourselves in our truer social nature. No crisis can alter the fact that the surrender of aspiration to circumstance, however necessary, is a setback for humanity. If we have to retreat to safeguard the lines of communication along which we have advanced, we become less, not greater, and the rift between fact and ideal which the absolutist ignores appears at its very sharpest. Whenever this is denied, we may suspect the influence of a narrowing political compartmentalism, which is prepared to build a political theory on the administrator's evidence alone.

The philosopher, however, does not suffer from these limitations, and if he subscribes to the offending doctrine it must be for more fundamental reasons of method. In the outstanding case of Hegel and his successors the reason lies in their pantheistic monism, which is incompatible with the facts of the personal life, and draws its categories from the lower sphere of merely animate existence. In such a system value is correlative with wholeness. In an advanced logical form, such as that given it by Hegel, it admits degrees of value, but these are in detail, as value as such is in principle, correlative with degrees of wholeness. It also insists that this wholeness, in which existence and value are one, is the consummation of reason: all reasoning both works up to it and depends upon it. The whole is the truth and the freedom of its parts.

This is a theory which applies with some exactness both to a physiological organism, and even to a society whose members have not yet become conscious of their ends. There is really a sphere in which the unconscious purposiveness of nature directs the individual to his goal, but it is emphatically not the sphere of conscious and aspiring humanity. It is the sphere of instinct, of biological organism. It is that of the sub-human, not that of the supra-human. So far from being the consummation of reason, it ceases to be true to the extent that conscious reason is at work. The whole, as given, cannot be the truth and freedom of the parts when the parts are engaged in a still doubtful attempt to produce the whole. It is not suggested that wholeness and coherence give way on the level of consciousness to a crude indetermination, but rather that they cease to be immanent directing forces and become ideals. In the state, for example, wholeness is not given, but is to be made. The totalitarian state, which takes it as given, as the actual truth of individuality, is really a practical attempt to deny the importance of consciousness, and it is not surprising to find that "Brawn, not brain" is a conspicuous item of its propaganda.¹ Identifying, as it does, reason with an existing form of organization, it cannot but condemn the more original flights of reason as unreasonable.

This is a clear contradiction in terms, and it arises from the importation into a discussion which concerns the conscious life of man of the inapplicable conception of a Reason which belongs to nobody in particular. This conception, as we saw, is proper to the level of mere instinct. The advance to the conscious life brings with it a clear separation of ideal and actual, and it is this separation alone which can give rise to a sense of value. To see in the human craving for wholeness nothing but the self-repetition of a whole which is immanent is to deny this separation, and therefore to explain consciousness in terms of what is less developed than consciousness. It is no reply to say the separation is transcended rather than denied, for the transcendence of a distinction involves the preservation in equal measure of the factors distinguished, and the totalitarian state sacrifices the one to the other without concealment. It is possible to imagine a state in which organization and spontaneity are completely reconciled, but it would not be a state in which the spiritual integrity of the person is derived from communal solidarity: it would not be an "organic" or a "functional" state. It would be a

¹ Compare Herr Hitler's address at an athletic festival at Stuttgart on July 30, 1933. "The so-called intellectual party, with its stamp of Liberalism, was threatening the people with decay. 'Strong men are our protectors, not strong philosophers', he said" (*Manchester Guardian*, 1.8.33).

democratic state in which institutions would be completely and continuously responsive to a completely and continuously integrative discussion. The alleged transcendence of the distinction between fact and ideal is in fact its plain negation: it does not heal the breach made by consciousness: it only covers up the fact that consciousness has ever been.

This masquerade of infra-human categories as supra-human is characteristic of all forms of romantic pantheism. The real inspiration of the romantic revival was its worship of nature, and its general tendency was to find God immanent in natural process to the exclusion of man, who was somehow or other regarded as a blot on the landscape. It disliked reason and consciousness, precisely because they destroyed the sense of unity with nature. It treated morality as conventional because it demanded effort and precision, and made harsh inroads on the alleged idyllic innocence of the woods. It substituted for the Platonic-Christian God, the God to Whom His creatures aspire, and all the more intimately for the consciousness which reproduces at an infinite distance the consciousness of God Himself, the old God of sea and forest and mountain, with the smiling face and the pitiless heart, whose altars once reeked with human sacrifice, and who returned after nineteen centuries of Christian respite to demand this last sacrifice of human dignity and idealism.

It may seem unfair to associate the massive logical structure of Hegel's absolutism with the reactionary sentimentalism of his poetic contemporaries; and it is certain that Hegel paid to reason and to order the due homage which they denied. But he too failed to discern the gap between spirit and nature, and therefore he too fell to a false interpretation of human idealism. He assimilated the coherent end which it seeks to the coherent background from which it arises, and thus linked God and nature over the head of humanity. From this contamination by the spirit of his time not even his great insight could save him. It illuminates the detail of his work, but is prevented from affecting the outline. It is perpetually frustrated by the application to spiritual endeavour of categories suited to instinctive reactions: by the false confinement in a biological mould of reason of all the aspiring faculties of man, including reason itself: by the dissolution of God into an impersonal immanence, in which spirit, being one with nature, can no longer inspire nature, and nature, being one with spirit, can no longer aspire to spirit.

From this fundamental blunder the totalitarian conception of the state is a natural deduction. It explains how

people come to find wisdom only in governors and institutions, for whence should the part derive wisdom, save from the concentrated wisdom of the whole? It explains how people can be genuinely religious and yet acquiesce in the subjection of religion to its social function, for how should the claims of the lesser whole conflict with those of the greater? It explains, finally, how people with a fine moral insight have come to interpret morality in terms of political obedience. The claims of morality are peculiarly irreconcilable with the sub-spiritual category of part and whole. They cannot be absorbed into a given rational whole, for the ideal by which they are guided is still unaccomplished. In all spiritual activities, reasoning included, aspiration rather than participation is the central characteristic. But if they are first of all recognized for what they are, and then intellectually misrepresented as forms of participation, they will tend to retain for their interpreters their true inward character, and at the same time be classified as mere aspects of the social good.

But against all such theories, any philosophy which is determined to do justice to personality must maintain that political obligation, the claim of the socially given, however important in its indirect contribution to the spiritual life of man, is subordinate to the direct obligations which he owes to truth and morality, and indeed only holds on their account: and that the category of part and whole, the misuse of which has led to such a radical misconstruction of political facts, should give way in all investigations which concern the spirit to that of aspirant and archetype.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM.¹

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THE first thing about academic freedom to which I would invite your attention is that academic freedom is not something that lies in the gift of college councils, professorial boards or other governing bodies of universities. The demand for academic freedom is in its essence a claim by the university upon the community at large. It is a right to be recognized by the public, and depends everywhere on the existing state of public opinion. In New Zealand there can be little difficulty for anyone in so diagnosing the case. I am aware that from America much has been heard of threats to this freedom which arise apparently from a different source. In that country, it is said, academic governing bodies are in the habit of stifling the expression by university teachers of certain trends of thought, on the ground that these are calculated to scare away prospective donors of endowment funds. That is a question which under present conditions does not arise in this country—fortunately or unfortunately I will not say, though I pause to remark that those persons who now profess themselves most concerned about menaces to freedom of speech for university teachers are found to be, to a surprising extent, identical with those who pin their faith to the accumulation of private endowments as the means of keeping the universities clear of what they call political control. In New Zealand, then, we are concerned with the attitude towards the university of the representatives of government, or its administrative departments, and the practical question for any academic governing body—let it be ever so fully seized of the paramount necessity to its institution of intellectual autonomy, and indeed just because it is so seized—the practical question must

¹ Speech at a meeting of the Auckland University District Court of Convocation, 27th April, 1933, in support of the amendment.

Motion (Mr. W. H. Cocker, LL.B.): "That the Court of Convocation approves and endorses the principle of academic freedom and regards it as a matter of the highest importance that all interference on the part of any outside political authority or any University governing body with freedom of opinion by members of a University staff, except in so far as such expression of opinion may involve a breach of the law, should be strenuously resisted."

Amendment (Rev. H. Ranston, Litt.D.): "That this Court of Convocation is in favour of all legitimate academic freedom for a university teacher to express his views on important questions."

be that of what are the organized measures by which this freedom may be most effectually supported and defended as a concrete right, to be made good in the political community as it is, against attacks and challenges from whatever quarter. This being the situation, we are able to estimate at its true worthlessness the impossibilist line of criticism that has been taken against the solution proposed here in Auckland. This solution, as you know, is that where the utterances of any member of the teaching staff have been challenged from any authoritative quarter outside, the Council will entrust the handling of the matter, and the question of the issuing of any statement defining the attitude of the teaching body generally, to the executive committee of the academic body, the Professorial Board. Adverse criticism has been heaped upon this proposal,¹ upon the Board for approving it, upon the Council for adopting it, and again upon the Board for accepting it. But what does it all amount to? Are the critics prepared to deny that defence involves organization, and that organization involves some form of discipline? Or is the right of (academic) free speech in the peculiar position that the sole permissible method of defending it is to do nothing? This typically pacifist line of reasoning appears only the more inept when it is noticed that, despite that delegation of its powers to the Professorial Board which I have mentioned, it is still the governing body of the College which will be held responsible by the public authorities. If we will only set ourselves thus to appreciate the general bearings of the case, we shall not be intimidated by the strictures of self-righteous and ill-informed individuals to the Southward who (as a variant upon their more usual teaching of the need for emancipation from all traditions whatsoever) now make a parade of what they describe as the high traditions of their own institutions in this matter.² There can, it seems to me,

¹ Originally based on "Report on University Administration", by M. R. O'Shea, B.Com., Registrar, Auckland University College. Section *xxi*, paragraph (iii), page 26, reads as follows: "After having given the whole question a great deal of consideration, I would recommend that every endeavour be made to leave university consideration of any particular cases in the hands of a standing academic committee of deans as a place for consideration in the first instance. If such a standing committee were set up as representative of the academic side of the college, with instructions to handle such questions as this on its own initiative as its own particular duty, there should be very little trouble in this regard. Most members of the staff are accurately estimated by their colleagues, and such judgment should carry sufficient weight to be accepted by the public."

² But since these words were spoken, evidence has been forthcoming that not even the high traditions referred to have proved immune from the corrosive action of the restless spirit of Inquiry. See a Report of Victoria University College Council (30th October, 1933):

"The very small number [of students] whose conduct and beliefs are in conflict with the great majority of the community attract attention entirely out of proportion to their influence in the college. Their influence must, and will, be restrained within reasonable bounds."

(Compare the use of the word "legitimate" in the amendment cited above, to which exception was taken, of course, on the usual lines of the Benthamite superstition of absolute analysis.)

be no difficulty with the question so long as we remember firstly that a university has to exist within the general community, and secondly that the community at large is not a university—not yet!

The next main point I would submit for your consideration is that if you are to claim, much less exercise, the right of academic freedom, you must first be academic. Here again we are confronted by an eminently paradoxical state of affairs. If you take stock of the people who have arrogated to themselves the defence of the ideals of universities *in partibus infidelibus*, what do you find? You find that they include, almost to a man, the representatives of those movements in educational thought and practice of which the tendency is utterly to subvert everything that is distinctively academic in the educational system. They come straight from their commination services over New Zealand education in which "academic" is the final anathema, and proceed to rally round the standard of "academic freedom". Now you can't eat your cake and have it like this. You can't be a realist in educational doctrine,¹ and at the same time expect to enjoy rights which are meaningless except on the basis of that academic tradition which you have rejected. The powers which you have suffered to grow up in and through your change of doctrinal front won't let you. You may be a "new psychologist" and abjure "intellectualism". You may be a "New Education"-ist, denying that there is any such thing as a general mental training,² crying down all instruction in grammar or logic, substituting the "Daltonian" research of the kindergarten for grounding in principles, and so forth. In the name of freedom of choice or self-expression for the student, you may allow any sort of outside body—school, teachers' institute, government department, profession—anybody at all, so long as it isn't the university—to dictate the range and standard of the university's entrance requirements and curriculum. In the name of freedom for the schools you may advocate accrediting for entrance, or the overruling of the living judgment of the university's examiners by systems of "adjustment" devised and operated by clerks in government offices who know nothing about the subjects concerned. Then when you come, perhaps, to realize what a powerful bureaucratic machine you have built up out of your little pet "freedoms" and "emancipations", you complain because it acts according to its nature. You forget that you have emptied out of university education everything that gives it a

¹ Or in any other.

² I.e., denying universals.

right to resist such alien domination. A university conducted on the principles of educational realism has no more claim to academic freedom than any training college or technical school, on the narrowest possible conception of the functions of such bodies. There can, in short, be no academic freedom outside of the academic tradition. If exponents of the "newer" educational ideas demand academic freedom, it is only as parasites upon a system which they repudiate. I cannot take them seriously as partisans of academic freedom.

I would now invite you to follow me in inquiring just on what grounds the community has come to accord that degree of habitual toleration to the practice of "free speech" (of which, I suppose, "academic" freedom is a specially luminous example) which makes it plausible for the devotees of that practice to claim it as a right. The famous argument of that eminent Victorian, J. S. Mill—the argument so often repeated by his followers and quoted once again here tonight—to the effect that the enunciation of a single new truth is so important as to impose upon the community the duty of encouraging the expression of an unlimited quantity of apparent errors on the offchance that one of them might turn out to be it, is not distinguished by a sense of proportion, and indeed appears to border on the hysterical. Anybody surely can call to mind offhand a hundred true propositions which would not be worth the risk. The fundamental argument for free speech is the moral one, namely, that it serves to reduce to a practical minimum the occasions on which it may become the moral duty of the individual to break the law. The death of Socrates, as you will have noticed, is a favourite standby of the free-speech enthusiasts. But if anybody is sufficiently interested in the death of Socrates to read the *Crito* he will discover two things. The first is that Socrates refused the opportunity to evade his sentence. But, secondly, the reader will find that it is essential to the argument by which Socrates justifies this refusal of his that the laws of Athens were such as to have allowed him the opportunity of persuading his fellow-citizens to change the law in any particular wherein he thought the law was wrong. Where the minority, as we put it nowadays, has the full chance to turn itself into the majority, it has not the moral right or duty which it might otherwise have to resist the execution of a law of which it disapproves. But obviously this, the moral argument for free speech, has its own inherent limitations. Does anybody believe that with the utmost possible extension of the right of free speech we can secure that a case will never arise in which the individual will find it his moral duty

to resist the law? This world is not so neat and tidy a concern as all that, whatever the J. S. Mills and other intellectual maiden-aunts may say or think to the contrary. So if the State is there to uphold the law, and knows that the institution of free speech, with all its undoubted advantages as a hedging bet, is still far from being a certainty, on what grounds—on what moral grounds—can the State be called upon to put its shirt on Free Speech?

This brings me to my final point, that I would think more highly of the self-constituted defenders of academic freedom if we heard less from them about the right and more about the duty of free speech. If there exists today in our midst that instinctive concern for freedom in speech and writing which my opponents in this debate are now seeking to exploit, the credit is due not to those who have agitated for the right, but to those who took it and were ready to take the consequences also. To the man who is prepared to venture all on the communication of the new truth as he finds it in him, I pay my humble respects. If freedom of speech is ever to exist as a constitutional right, it will come through the custom, habit, or practice of free speaking, ventured on these terms. I do not undertake to pay such a man a salary for life. I know he will not expect me to. But for the man who goes snooping around cadging guarantees beforehand I cannot raise the same feelings. The man, I would only add, who professes all I have said about telling the truth and risking the consequences, and then switches over to the argument about what is the proper attitude that "we" (the university?—the community?) should take up toward such an one—to the manifest intent that there shall be no consequences, or at least no unpleasant ones—that man, I say, is twin brother to the former. Whatever their ultimate standing in the neat and tidy paradise on which they rest their hopes, they are neither of them good enough for this disorderly world.

AN EXPERIMENT WITH THE CRICHTON TEST.

By P. M. BACHELARD, Ph.D.,
Lecturer in Education, Teachers' College, Melbourne.

THIS test is found in P. B. Ballard's book "Group Tests of Intelligence". He devised it for "the more intelligent adolescents and adults". As Lecturer in Experimental Education for the Diploma of Education, I gave this test to the students of this course at the University of Melbourne to obtain data to illustrate the statistical calculations required for the standardisation of mental tests, and by this personal experience to arouse interest in these calculations, which so often are irksome, especially to arts students.

In typing the test some liberty has been taken with the original order of the questions. The 28 questions allow themselves to be grouped under three main headings : 1-17 literary section, 18-26 arithmetical section, 27-28 ciphers. The respective marks are 17, 14 and 19 (total=50). Each of the first two parts may be further subdivided : I. Analogies, 1-5 ; II. Absurdities, 6-9 ; III. Appreciation of Meaning, 10-17 ; IV. Ordinary Arithmetic, 18-21 ; V. Visual Imagination, 22-26.

I. GENERAL RESULT.

Ballard sets no time limit. The exigencies of the one hour lecture period forced us to allow only 40 minutes. Forty-seven students were present at the test : twenty-eight arts students (eighteen women, ten men), nineteen science students (nine women, ten men).

Although the small number does not warrant any generalization, some of the results may prove of interest, as pointing to a possible defect in a purely scientific training of University students and supplying some experimental evidence to determine whether science students are neglecting their literary education.

The ordinary average is 25.6 (women 26.5, men 24.4). The fact that the mean is approximately half of the total marks is perhaps a sign that the test as a whole is suited to discriminate between individuals of such a selected group as ours. It inspires some hope that the test may prove a fit instrument for measuring the intelligence of the more intelligent adults.

Again, the fact that the range is 14-47 seems to show that the time limit of 40 minutes was not too short. If more time had been given, it is fairly certain that the majority of the students would have solved questions 27 and 28. Question 27 was solved by 73%, and ranks ninth in order of ascending difficulty. Yet 8 marks are assigned to this question. It





Fig. I.

may be asked whether a person of average intelligence cannot solve these puzzles if sufficient time is given. We have had occasion, furthermore, to notice that people with some practice with such puzzles (*e.g.*, army officers) are enabled to answer these two questions within a relatively short time. They are given 19 marks, and we may question the wisdom of weighing them to the extent of more than one-third of the total score.

II. LITERARY AND ARITHMETICAL SECTIONS.

In this discussion we omit the last two questions (27 and 28).

Figures 2 and 3 show that the marks in the literary section are normally distributed, but that there is no approach to a normal distribution in the arithmetical section. The correlation between the two sections is 0.09, PE. 0.09. A glance at Fig. 3



will suffice to see the reason for the absence of correlation. The arithmetical questions, evidently, proved easier than the literary ones for our selected group. The ordinary average for the literary part is 9.5 (55.7%) and for the arithmetical part 9.9 (71%).

Fig. 4 represents the relative difficulty of these 26 questions. The number of right answers were counted, and the questions were ranked in order of ascending difficulty. Rank 13 is taken as indicating the level of mean difficulty. It will be noticed than nine out of seventeen literary questions are appreciably higher than this line. Only one arithmetical question is considerably above the line of mean difficulty. The difference between the positive and negative variations from this line is +39 for the literary section, and -34 for the arithmetical part.

We must therefore question whether the special weight attached to the arithmetical questions 21, 22 and 26 is justified. They are given 2, 3, 3 marks respectively, although they rank fourth, first and fourteenth in order of ascending difficulty.

Fig. 4 will also account for the low coefficient of reliability obtained by correlating odd and even numbers of the 26 questions. It is 0.47, PE. 0.07. The even numbers, on an average, are of




Fig. 4.

greater difficulty than the odd ones. The difference between the positive and negative variations from the line of mean difficulty is +8 for the even, and -3 for the odd numbers. In other words, the two series do not constitute two tests of equal difficulty.

III. COMPARISON BETWEEN SEXES AND COURSES.

TABLE I.—AVERAGE SCORES (PERCENTAGE) IN THE LITERARY AND THE ARITHMETICAL SECTIONS.

1. *General Averages.*

| | | Both Courses. | Arts Course. | Science Course. |
|----------------------|----|------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| Both Sections | .. | 62.7 | 59.9 | 66.7 |
| Literary Section | .. | 55.7 | 58.2 | 52.3 |
| Arithmetical Section | .. | 71.1 | 62.0 | 84.6 |

2. *Literary Section.*

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------------------|----|----|--------------|---|------|
| Women | { Arts Science | .. | .. | 59.8 59.5 | } | 59.7 |
| Men | { Arts Science | .. | .. | 55.3 45.3 | } | 50.3 |

3. *Arithmetical Section.*

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------------------|----|----|--------------|---|------|
| Women | { Arts Science | .. | .. | 67.9 84.1 | } | 73.3 |
| Men | { Arts Science | .. | .. | 51.4 85.0 | } | 68.2 |

4. *Averages in Both Sections.*

| | | | | | | |
|----------------|----------------|----|----|--------------|---|------|
| Arts Course | { Women Men | .. | .. | 63.4 53.5 | } | 59.9 |
| Science Course | { Women Men | .. | .. | 70.6 63.3 | } | 66.7 |

The women in our group consistently score higher than the men. In the literary part they score 9.4, and in the arithmetical part 5.1 marks more than the men. It has been suggested that this is not a mere chance happening, on the ground that the teaching profession is the main profession open to intelligent women.

The more striking result is the poor score made in the literary section by the men of the science course. Their average compares unfavourably with the averages of the other three groups. It is 10 points below the average of arts men, 14.2 and 14.5 below the averages of the women of the science and arts courses.

This shortcoming does not manifest itself in the case of science women. Their average is practically the same as that of the arts women. It may be that women have a greater sensibility for the finer meaning of literary expression, which preoccupation with the harder facts of science cannot impair.

It seems otherwise with men. It is improbable that the men tested are naturally handicapped in this respect. Yet this experimental finding of their actual handicap is probably not a mere chance result. Independently of all experimental evidence, the fact has obtruded itself upon the notice of those in charge of training science teachers for secondary schools, that these students do suffer from a neglected literary education. For this reason special classes are arranged for these students in the Teachers' College at Melbourne. *A priori* it seems but natural that reading confined to scientific language, which is largely estranged from the vernacular, and in its omission of the infinite variety of human sentiments and situations is limited to a narrow field of thought and expression, may endanger spelling, finer turns of grammar and fluent expression of thoughts lying outside that narrow field. The Crichton Test does not test these abilities. By its questions, however, on analogies, absurdities and shades of meaning, it probes the readiness of the mind to detect a number of relations between abstract fundamenta, while the student of physical science is habitually limited mainly to analogies and identities between concrete facts. This consideration receives some support from Table II.

TABLE II.—PERCENTAGE OF CORRECT ANSWERS.

| | | Analogy. | Absurdities. | Shades of Meaning. |
|-------|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------|
| Men | { Science .. Arts .. | 46.0 38.0 | 60.0 77.5 | 37.5 55.0 |
| Women | { Science .. Arts .. | 55.5 51.1 | 80.5 87.5 | 51.4 51.4 |

In the test of analogies the science students do better than the arts students. In the tests of absurdities and appreciation of meaning the science men especially are considerably inferior. A fair discriminating test is question 8, which offers for criticism a more abstract statement. The answers of the science men are poor compared with those of the arts men, science women and arts women. The percentages of correct answers are respectively 40, 70, 88 and 83.

It can hardly be contended that an arts course supplies a special training for answering the simple questions of the literary part of this test. The solution is a mere matter of attentively following the development of meaning and being sensitive to

any jar that may occur in the unfolding pattern or to a flash of insight indicating to which class a statement belongs. This should be an accomplishment of every educated person. It is probable, however, that success in the arithmetical part is made considerably easier by a scientific training. Thirteen out of nineteen science students (68.4%) score 13-14 marks out of a total of 14 in this section. Only five out of twenty-eight, or 17.8%, of the arts students succeed in doing so. We may then conclude that the superior score of the science students in both sections together, 66.7 as against 59.9 of the arts students, is due, to a large extent, to acquired facility. The test seems weighted in favour of science students.

THE CRICHTON TEST.

(Ballard, "Group Tests of Intelligence", Ch. V.)

I.

In each of the first five questions you have to find a fourth word that goes with the third as the second goes with the first.

Sample: Table is to wood as window is to . . . ? Ans. : Glass.

1. Music is to opera as poetry is to . . . ?
2. Word is to thing as money is to . . . ?
3. Tub is to but as pot is to . . . ?
4. House is to furniture as mind is to . . . ?
5. Aspect is to space as phase is to . . . ?

II.

In each of the next four passages one word has been altered so as to make the meaning nonsensical. In each passage pick out the misfitting word.

6. The mind converts and changes every hindrance into help. And thus it is probable I may gain by opposition and let the obstacle hinder me on the road.

7. In book-buying you not infrequently condone an extravagance by the reflection that this particular purchase will be a bad investment: that you are not squandering income but sinking capital.

8. The exclusive in fashionable life does not see that he excludes himself from enjoyment in the attempt to appropriate it. The exclusionist in religion does not see that he shuts the door of heaven on himself, in striving to shut in others.

9. The heart is a great reservoir, which distributes food, drink, air, and heat from every part of the system, in exchange for its waste material. It knocks at the gate of every organ seventy or eighty times a minute, calling upon it to receive its supplies and unload its refuse.

III.

Among the following eight sentences some are witty (call them W); others are wise as well, and express profound truths (call them T); others are commonplace (call them C); and others are nonsensical, as they either say something silly or say the same thing twice (call them N). Mark each on your answer paper as W, T, C, or N.

10. If you put a chain around the neck of a slave the other end fastens itself around your own.

11. Show me the man hour by hour in his own home, from the rising of the sun to its going down, and I will tell you what manner of man he is.

12. No man will be a sailor who has contrivance enough to get himself into a jail ; for, being in a ship is being in a jail with the chance of being drowned.

13. A gentleman is a man who is never rude unintentionally.

14. Our virtues are like trees ; they extend further and further as they grow larger.

15. One man with truth on his side constitutes a majority.

16. The man who raises his hand against a woman except in the way of kindness is a contemptible scoundrel.

17. If a man begins to think he is as wise as he is good, he will end by thinking that he is as good as he is wise.

IV.

18. If I toss up two pennies together several times they may come down in three different ways, *i.e.*, as HH, HT, or TT (where H means head, and T tail). In how many different ways may four pennies come down ?

19. In a certain family there are four boys who are allowed to go to the swimming baths two at a time. In how many different pairs could they go ?

20. Read question 18 again, and then say in how many different ways 100 pennies may come down if tossed into the air together. (2 marks.)

21. The first odd number is 1, the second odd number is 3, the third odd number is 5, and so on. What is the 200th odd number ? (3 marks.)

V

22. Several little wooden cubes, each with an edge of one inch, are put together to form a solid cube with an edge of three inches. This big cube is then painted red all over the outside. When the paint is dry the big cube is broken up into the original little cubes. Now answer these four questions about the little cubes :

22. How many cubes will have paint on four sides ?

23. How many cubes will have paint on three sides ?

24. How many cubes will have paint on two sides ?

25. How many cubes will have no paint on ?

26. If sixteen oranges are arranged on the ground in a compact square with four forming each side of the square, and then more oranges are placed on top to form a pyramid, that is, a heap getting regularly less as it rises, until it ends with only one on top, how many oranges are there in this pyramid ? (3 marks.)

VI.

In dealing with the next two questions, you may scribble on the back of your answer paper.

27. The sentence given below is printed in cipher : figures are put to represent letters. Translate it. The following facts will help you :

(a) There are in the English language very few words of one letter.

(b) The letter most frequently occurring at the end of words is " e ".

(c) 3 stands for " l " and 4 for " t ".

2 870 4574 2 078 7 324431 3741. (8 marks.)

28. The following symbols make up a sentence. Translate it, bearing in mind what was said under (a) and (b) in the previous question, and noting that there is a certain pair of two-lettered words, one of which is the same as the other spelled backwards.

$\times \frac{\$||}{?* \sqrt{\sqrt{-||}}}$ $\frac{\sqrt{*}}{* \sqrt{||}} \frac{\{? - ||^*}{||\$? ?\{ - \div + \$|| -}$
(11 marks.) $\infty \times \infty - +$

RESEARCHES AND REPORTS.

LIGHT PRESSURE CONTACT.

SPATIAL DISCRIMINATION OF TOUCH *versus* KINÆSTHESIA.

By A. H. MARTIN, M.A., Ph.D.,
Lecturer in Psychology, University of Sydney.

THIS experiment is an adaptation and extension of that set out by Langfeld and Allport in their "Elementary Laboratory Course in Psychology" (p. 63). In this they suggest the use of three shapes about three-quarters of an inch in diameter, cut from sheet metal or stiff bristol board, such as a round disc, a diamond, and a star. These are to be pressed in turn lightly on the palm of the subject's hand, who then attempts to draw the shape on paper as he perceived it. A second trial is then made, in which the shape is held in place with a pencil while the subject runs his forefinger round the edge; the subject then draws the apparent shape as before. The experiment, as outlined by these authors, appeared unsatisfactory in several ways:

(a) Superficial shapes are rather difficult to manipulate without a handle attachment of some kind.

(b) The kinæsthetic sensations used in the second part are not localized by being restricted to any one joint or set of muscles, but distributed over various members.

(c) Touch sensations are also present in the second part of the experiment, whereas it is desirable to compare touch with isolated kinæsthesia.

To remedy the above-mentioned defects, the following modification of the apparatus and methods were arranged: A set of ten shapes, each measuring about one inch in diameter, were cut from sheet metal, and in the back centre of each was soldered a flat headed nail two and a half inches in length to serve as a handle; this enabled the shape to be manipulated with ease by the experimenter and, for the second part of the experiment, to be held quite firmly in a clamp stand. The shapes chosen for confusion and contrast effects were the circle and ellipse, square and rectangle, triangle and four-pointed star, five and six pointed stars and hexagon and octagon.

The experiment was divided into two parts. The first tested the degree of discrimination by touch. The shapes were applied in irregular order, each a number of times, to the palm of the hand, the volar surface of the forearm, and the cheek. The work was carried out behind a screen or with the subject's eyes closed. The subject endeavoured to name the shape. The percentage of right answers was calculated for each area; this incidentally gave the student an opportunity to test for himself whether Vierordt's Law applied to tactal discrimination. In the second part in which discrimination by kinæsthesia was made, the shapes were placed in turn in a clamp stand. A brass thimble was fastened to the subject's forefinger. This had a sharp projecting point extending about three-quarters of an

inch beyond the fingertip. The hand was kept firm by being rested on the table, and the forefinger, kept rigid, traced the line of the shape by moving the end of the thimble round its edges. The shapes were screened from the subjects so that their judgments were based entirely on kinæsthetic sensations from the basal knuckle joint. Another series was made with movement from the wrist, the hand and finger kept rigid.

The results from this contrast experiment were thoroughly convincing as to the superiority of kinæsthesia over touch in the discrimination of form. The average results for the group of fifty-four persons are given in the table below:

Percentage of Correct Answers.

| | |
|---|------|
| Touch sensations on palm | 62.9 |
| Touch sensations on volar surface of forearm | 33.9 |
| Touch sensations on cheek | 36.4 |
| Kinæsthetic sensations from knuckle joint of fore finger | 73.1 |
| Kinæsthetic sensations from wrist joint | 75.1 |

Incidentally, one error may be pointed out in Vierordt's Law, in that it takes no account of evolutionary factors. It states that "the fineness of the sense of locality belonging to any area of the skin increases in direct proportion with the distance of that area from the axis about which it is rotated. The relative fineness of the organ's local sense is a function of its mobility. Thus an uninterrupted increase of the power of localisation exists in the arm from the acromium to the tips of the fingers; an increase of its movability, on the whole, also exists."¹ While this may be demonstrated concerning the arm or the leg, it is not true of the mouth, which for most species below man and the primates, is the principal organ of manipulation. A dog or bird experiences most objects in close contact by means of the snout and lips or beak. This has persisted even in the genus *homo sapiens* despite the development of touch-contact endings in the finger tips. Today the touch-contact organs round the lips are chiefly stimulated by means of osculation, which may thus be regarded as the secondary utilization of a "vestigial" location of the particular sense in question. In the case of the snout some primitive peoples retain the rubbing of noses, thus utilizing the sensitivity of skin sensation endings round the nostrils.

¹ Ladd and Woodworth: "Physiological Psychology", pp. 398 and 399.



REVIEWS.

MENTAL DISEASES. Second Edition. From the Catechism Series of Messrs. E. & S. Livingstone, Edinburgh. Price: 1s. 6d.

This small book of 80 pages is one of a long series apparently prepared for the student. If they are all as admirable as this one, then they are not only just the thing for students, but most useful for the teacher as well. The book treats successively of The Nature of Mental Disease, Neurasthenia, Anxiety Neurosis, Hysteria, Obsessional Neuroses, Psychasthenia, Manic-Depressive Psychosis, Mania, Melancholia, Dementia Præcox, Paraphrenia, Paranoia, Acute Confusional Psychosis, Mental Symptoms in Drug Addiction, Alcoholic Psychoses, General Paralysis, Epilepsy, Dementia, Mental Deficiency, Special Varieties of Mental Deficiency, Law in Relation to Mental Disease, Mental Deficiency Act, Treatment, Mental Hygiene. But it is not merely the completeness of the range of subjects which commends the book to one: it is still more the masterly handling of the matter. The knowledge displayed is very wide and does full justice to the distinction between functional and organic disorder. It is clearly admitted that there can be psychological causes of disorder as well as organic ones: that battle seems to have been fought and won. Still the book wisely insists upon the likelihood of organic causation where we might have been satisfied to presume the cause to be merely emotional disturbance or failure of adjustment only.

The form of the presentation is unusual, but eminently successful. It is, as the title indicates, a catechism. Questions are put and answered. For example, Neurasthenia is treated as follows: *What is neurasthenia?* *What is the differential diagnosis of neurasthenia?* *What is the treatment of neurasthenia?* *What is traumatic neurasthenia?* Each question is fully and ably answered, the answers giving just the information required. It must not be thought that, because the book is compendious, the information is scanty: it emphatically is not. Indeed, after reading many woolly books on psychiatry, with their indefiniteness and doubtful and differing classifications, it is a real pleasure to turn to this book with its clearness, system, and emphasis on essentials.

H. TASMAN LOVELL.

LOGIC IN PRACTICE. By L. Susan Stebbing. Pp. 113, Methuen's Monographs on Philosophy and Psychology. Price 2s. 6d. net.

This small book, though professedly elementary, would probably be of interest to the more advanced student of the subject. In the longest chapter of the book, "Deductive Forms", the author gives a clear exposition of the technicalities of formal deductive logic. Referring to induction at just sufficient length to show that it is not a form of valid reasoning, Miss Stebbing proceeds to discuss such topics as the proposition, degrees of inferribility, distribution, fallacies, transitive and intransitive relations, etc., in a way rather more forceful than that to be found in many more elaborate treatises on Logic, although the treatment is, of course, superficial.

The other five chapters account for the title, and show how all thought possesses or lacks certain logical characters. While a study of logic will not necessarily enable us to arrive at truth on other subjects, Miss Stebbing emphasises that a knowledge of how propositions hang together, and of the conditions to which argument must conform to be valid, will at least assist us to detect confusion and insincerity. Miss Stebbing quotes freely from eminent statesmen

and economists to illustrate the point that a recognition of the logical characters of sound argument is not so easily found as eminent statesmen and economists.

P.H.P.

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS OF THE NEUROSES. By Helene Deutsch. The Hogarth Press, London. 1932. Pp. 237. Price in Great Britain: 10s. 6d. net.

This book is No. 23 in the International Psycho-Analytical Library, edited by Ernest Jones.

According to the publisher's notice, the volume fulfils a long-felt need, inasmuch as it is a comprehensive text book on psycho-analysis. The claim is scarcely justified. Dr. Deutsch assumes that her reader is thoroughly conversant both with psycho-analytical theory and with the technique of psycho-analysis. She reminds us that the student proposing to practice psycho-analysis is unable to obtain a clinical experience comparable with that which is available to the one proposing to embark upon ordinary medical practice. About all that the former can do, apart from being analysed himself, is to read of cases as treated by competent analysts. What Dr. Deutsch has attempted is to present a wealth of carefully selected illustrative material in a thoroughly logical and systematic fashion.

Without being a comprehensive text-book, the volume is much more than a mere string of case-histories. There appears first an introductory chapter on the part played by the actual mental conflict in the formation of the neuroses. Thereafter, the book consists of three main parts—a series of chapters on hysteria, a second series on phobias, and a third series on obsessional neuroses. Thus there is a section on each of the main types of neurosis, each section being composed, in the main, of just those portions of various case-histories which are relevant to it. There is also an appendix on melancholia. Interwoven among the illustrative examples is sufficient theory to give to the student a clear picture of each variety of neurosis.

I think that the book should serve admirably the purpose for which it is intended.

C. R. MCRAE.

THE PSYCHO-ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN. By Melanie Klein. The Hogarth Press, London, 1931. Pp. 393. Price in Great Britain, 18s.

Since only an analyst of wide experience would be thoroughly competent to review this book, it is with considerable diffidence that I undertake the task.

Dr. Klein is a thorough-going disciple of Freud. Of his teachings she accepts not only those general principles which have found fairly general acceptance, but also, it appears, every detail of his system down to his wildest and most improbable guesses. Her volume, therefore, offers nothing in the way of criticism of the Freudian view of the child mind. Rather is it a justification and extension of that view, based upon a much wider experience of the analysis of children than Freud himself ever enjoyed.

The book is divided into two parts, the one practical, the other theoretical. The second or theoretical section, in which the author discusses the effect of early anxiety-situations on the development of the child, and particularly on his or her sexual development, contains little that will be new to the student who knows his Freud. It is the first half of the book, entitled, "The Technique of Child Analysis", which is the more interesting. In the earlier chapters, Dr. Klein describes and illustrates the special technique which she has devised

to enable the curative method of psycho-analysis to be applied to children of very tender years.

Child Analysis has apparently followed two main lines of development—one represented by Anna Freud and the other by Dr. Klein. According to Anna Freud, the technique with young children should be different from the classical technique used with adults. One reason which she advances in support of the variation is that children do not develop a transference-neurosis in the course of the treatment. With this opinion Dr. Klein does not agree—she asserts that there arise with children the same kinds of transference situations as with adults. Her effort has been to devise a technique which is essentially the same as that used with adults. Naturally the main difficulty encountered is that of language. Psycho-analysis has been called the “talking cure”; the classical technique involves the securing from the patient of a wealth of verbal material which young children cannot be expected to provide.

The method which Dr. Klein has developed is that of “Play Analysis”. “On a low table in my analytic room are laid out a number of small toys of a primitive kind—little wooden men and women, carts, carriages, motor-cars, trains, animals, bricks and houses, as well as paper, scissors, and pencils. Even a child who is usually inhibited in his play will at least glance at the toys or touch them, and will soon give me a first glimpse into its complexive life by the way in which it begins to play with them or lay them aside, or by its general attitude towards them.” Certain equipment other than these toys is essential in the room of the physician undertaking Play Analysis. One piece of special importance is a wash-basin with running water. “A child will go through a whole phase of its analysis playing round the wash-basin. . . . These games with water afford us a deep insight into the fundamental pre-genital fixations of the child, and are also a means of illustrating its sexual theories, giving us a knowledge of the relation between its sadistic phantasies and its reaction-formation, and showing the direct connection between its pre-genital and genital impulses.”

In brief, each small patient in his or her peculiar way plays with the equipment provided, and also presses into service the furniture of the room and the analyst herself. In so doing, the child reveals the complexes which lie at the root of the anxiety. As soon as possible, the analyst begins to interpret the play behaviour, and to put the interpretation before the child in language which it can understand. Dr. Klein provides a wealth of illustrative play behaviour, and of her own interpretations as presented to her patients. To any reader who has not mastered Freudian theory, or who lacks that combination of intuitive insight and blind faith which is necessary for its swallowing, many of the interpretations cited will appear to be highly improbable and humourless guesses. On the other hand, one gathers that the patients themselves invariably appreciate the justice of the interpretations and that their symptoms of nervousness, or sulkiness, or destructiveness, begin to disappear.

While Play Analysis may constitute the main method used with young children, even with the very youngest Dr. Klein does not depend entirely upon the observation of symbolical play. She endeavours to make her technique approximate as closely as possible to that of the master himself, that is, to make her cure a “talking” one. “One of the necessary conditions of a successfully terminated treatment is that the child, however young, should make use of language in analysis to the full extent of its capacity.”

Dr. Klein deals separately with the problems of analysis in the latency period and in puberty. While each period presents its own peculiar difficulties, for example, in the latency period children will neither play spontaneously like small children nor yet give verbal associations like an adult, the general truth is that, as the child grows older, more reliance is placed upon verbal associations, and the analyst becomes less dependent upon the observation and interpretation of play.

Having discussed the technique of the analysis of children, Dr. Klein proceeds to describe the characteristics of child behaviour which indicate the necessity of psycho-analysis. This guide to the manifestations which should be regarded as definitely serious is probably the part of the book which is of most value to ordinary readers, especially to parents. No parent, however, must read the chapter in the hope that, having read it, he will be able to say—"Well, anyhow, my child does not do this or that or that; there is then no need to take him to an analyst." For it appears that "every child passes through a neurosis differing only in degree from one individual to another. Since psycho-analysis has been found to be the most efficacious means of removing the neuroses of adults, it seems logical to make use of psycho-analysis in combating the neuroses of children, and, moreover, seeing that every child goes through a neurosis, to apply it to all children."

To any practitioner treating nervous disorders in children, I should think that this book would be indispensable. The student of psychology conversant with the doctrines of Freud and with the technique of adult analysis will find in it a clear presentation of the former, inasmuch as they deal with the child mind, and a very interesting development of the latter. If the student is a believer, he will go on believing. If he lacks the intuitive insight and blind faith mentioned above, he will find in the book much that is good sense interspersed with a great deal that is as silly as it looks.

C. R. MCRAE.

JOURNALS RECEIVED.

MIND. A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. Macmillan & Co. Annual subscription: 16s.

Vol. XLIII. No. 169. January, 1934. Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It: R. E. Hobart. Non-Denotative Names: Reginald Jackson. Burnet's Socrates: T. de Laguna. A Set of Axioms for the Theory of Deduction: Bernard Notcutt. No. 170. April, 1934. A Refutation of Realism: W. T. Stace. A Second Reply to Mr. Joseph: L. S. Stebbing. The Problem of the *Laches*: T. de Laguna. Independent Postulates Related to C. I. Lewis' Theory of Strict Implication: E. V. Huntington.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Published fortnightly. Columbia University, New York. Subscription: 4 dollars a year.

Vol. XXX. No. 22. October 26, 1933. Dualism and the Paradox of Reference: Arthur O. Lovejoy. No. 23. November 9. The Innocence of the Given: Donald C. Williams. No. 24. November 23. Studies in the Structure of Systems: Karl Schmidt. Is Idealism Incurably Ambiguous?: F. C. S. Schiller. No. 25. December 7. What is Speculative Idealism?: James Bissett Pratt. Hegel's Attitude on War and Peace:

A. C. Armstrong. No. 26. December 21. The Logic of Measurement: A. Cornelius Benjamin. Whitehead's Concept of Process—A Few Critical Remarks: Ralph B. Winn. Vol. XXXI. No. 1. January 4, 1934. The Conception of Derivation in Epistemology: Raphael Demos. The Universe of Light: Frederick J. E. Woodbridge. No. 2. January 18. Perspectivity and Objectivity: Paul L. De Largy. Objectivity of Esthetic Value: Carroll C. Pratt. No. 3. February 1. On the Attributes of Material Things: C. J. Ducasse. Appearance and Orientation: Grace A. de Laguna. No. 4. February 15. The Metaphysical Basis of Induction: George Todd Kalif. Report of the Thirty-third Annual Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association: Jesse V. Mauzey. No. 5. March 1. New Epistemological Method: Virgil C. Aldrich. Report of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association: Donald A. Piatt. No. 6. March 15. Verifiability, Truth and Verification: Ernest Nagel. Neo-Classicism, Platonism, and Romanticism: Paul Goodman. No. 7. March 29. The Objectivity of Mind: Clifford Barrett. The Organic Unity of Philosophy: George Arthur Wilson. Idealism, Mentalistic and "Speculative": Jared S. Moore.

PHILOSOPHY. Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy. Published Quarterly. Macmillan & Co. Annual subscription: 14s.

Vol. IX. No. 33. January, 1934. Mechanism, Purpose and the New Freedom: William McDougall. Some Points in the Philosophy of Physics—Time, Evolution and Creation: E. A. Milne. Sir Arthur Eddington and the Physical World: W. T. Stace. Cartesian Mechanism: S. V. Keeling. Goethe's Phenomenological Method: Fritz Heinemann. The Basis of Society: Arnold H. Kamiat.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. Organ of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. Baillière, Tindall & Cox. Price: 30s. per volume of four parts.

Vol. XIV. Part 4. October, 1933. Sandor Ferenczi, 1873–1933: Ernest Jones. Sandor Ferenczi—Memorial Address: Paul Federn. The Relation of Perversion-formation to the Development of Reality-sense: Edward Glover. Vol. XV. Part 1. January, 1934. Bodily and Mental Pain: Edoardo Weiss. Folie à Deux: C. P. Oberndorf. Mona Lisa and Feminine Beauty—A Study in Bisexuality: Fritz Wittels. The Treatment of Bewitchment in a Puritan Community: Merell Middlemore. The Early Infantile Sexuality of Man as compared with the Sexual Maturity of Other Mammals: Max Levy-Suhl.

JOURNAL OF GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY. Clark University Press. Annual subscription: 7 dollars.

Vol. XLIII. No. 1. September, 1933. The Acquisition of Skill in Infancy: H. M. Halverson. The Animal Mind: C. J. Warden. Adolescent Interests and Abilities: Gertrude Hildreth. Modern Trends in the Psychology of Maladjusted School Children: Marion Jenkins. An Experiment on the Order of Elimination of Blind Alleys in Maze Learning: Gerard de Montpellier. The Effect of Gonalectomy and Testicular Transplantation on Habit Formation and Retention in the White Rat: B. T. Liang. Visual Pattern Discrimination in the Macacus Rhesus Monkey: Claude C. Neet. A Study of the Personality Adjustments of Only and Intermediate Children: Albert A. Campbell. No. 2. December, 1933. The Normal Sensory Control of the Perfected Double-alternation Spatial-maze Habit in the Albino Rat: Barry Casper. Emotional Stability of the Hard of Hearing: Rudolf Pintner. Twin-similarities in Personality Traits: Harold D. Carter. The Sleep of Young Children: Martha May Reynolds and Helena Mallay. The Musical Ability of Mountain Children as measured by the Seashore Test of Musical Talent: Lester R. Wheeler and Viola D. Wheeler. A Study of Prediction of

Motor Rhythmic Performance of School Children: Harold M. Williams. A Study of the Relation of Age Interval to Degree of Resemblance of Siblings in Intelligence: F. H. Finch. Responses of Boys between the ages of Five and Sixteen Years to Hull's Postural Suggestion Test: Ramona Messerschmidt. The Suggestibility of Boys and Girls between the ages of Six and Sixteen Years: Ramona Messerschmidt.

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. Clark University Press. Annual subscription: 7 dollars.

Vol. IV. No. 3. August, 1933. Trends of the Voter's Mind: Edward S. Robinson. Students' Adjustments in Anger: H. Meltzer. The Effect of Fear upon Estimates of the Maliciousness of other Personalities: Henry A. Murray, jr. A Racial Difference in Perception: Robert H. Thouless. The Psychology of Adherence to the Old and of Acceptance of the New: Charles Homer Bean. No. 4. November, 1933. The Theory and Construction of the Personality Inventory: Robert G. Bernreuter. Temperament and Direction of Achievement: Keith Sward. An Examination of a Typical Test of Introversion-Extroversion by means of the Method of Similar Reactions: J. P. Guilford. The Nature of Attitude: D. D. Droba. Self-rating of Prisoners compared with that of College Students: Ray Mars Simpson.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE. Librairie Kundig, Geneva. Price of this issue: 6 francs, 50 cents.

Vol. XXIV. No. 93-94. June-September, 1933. La Genèse de l'Hypothèse—Étude Expérimentale: E. Claparède.

ARCHIVIO GENERALE DI NEUROLOGIA, PSICHIATRIA E PSICOANALISI. Quarterly. Naples.

Vol. XIV. No. 4. October, 1933. Sui tubercolomi del nucleo lenticolare: G. Pintus. Sui disturbi dell' equilibrio e della coordinazione motoria nelle lesioni dei lobi prefrontali: G. de Nigris. Pliche del cuoio capelluto negli alienati: V. Perazzi. Il fenomeno rabdico è un fenomeno oscillatorio: L. Caccia. Un raro caso di raptus omicida in un antico ebeffrono-catattonico: B. Mueller. Vol. XV. No. 1. January, 1934. In tema di semeiotica mentale: C. Enderle. Ricerche ematologiche nelle schizofrenie: P. Jedlowski. No. 2. April, 1934. Il trattamento delle malinconie endogene ed involutive con la ematoporfirina (photodyn): M. Levi Bianchini. La resistenza del neurotico contro la guarigione: H. Krisch. Di alcune ripercussioni della vita economica sulla psicopatologia umana: W. Eliasberg. Radiazioni della materia in rapporto ai poteri rabiidi dell' organismo umano: L. Caccia. Uno studio filogenetico della alienazione mentale e delle sue basi morfologiche: Trigant Burrow. La caratterologia psicoanalitica ed i suoi psicobiotipi: M. Levi Bianchini. La constituzione della "Società italiana di antropologia e psicologia criminale per la lotta contro il delitto" in Roma: B. Di Tullio. Relazione statistica, tecnica, sanitaria, sull' andamento dell' ospedale psichiatrico per il triennio 1 gennaio 1931 ad 31 Dicembre 1933: M. Levi Bianchini.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. Published by the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of the Sacred Heart. Milan.

Vol. XXV. No. 4-5. November, 1933. Tra fisica e metafisica: M. Fatta. La preuve d'existence en théodicée d'après Gauthier de Bruges: P. S. Belmond. Guglielmo d'Auvergne e la Provvidenza divina: A. Masnovo. Vol. XXVI. No. 1. January, 1934. Cronaca della Facoltà di Filosofia dell' Università cattolica del Sacro Cuore. "Esiste una 'filosofia cristiana' ?": P. Bartolomei. Nota sull' anticartesianismo di Malebranche: A. Del Noce. Studio critico sulla gnoseologia (o psicologia pura della conoscenza propria e attuale) di Giuseppe Zamboni: A. Rossi.

ANNALI DELLA R. SCUOLA NORMALE SUPERIORE DI PISA.
Quarterly. Bologna.

Series II—Vol. II. No. 4. November, 1933. Nuove ricerche sulla formazione filosofica di Epicuro: E. Bignone. Giudizio degli antichi Italici: G. Devoto. Vol. III. No. 1. February, 1934. Nuovi fragmenti degli *Altæ* di Callimaco: G. Vitelli. Dai papiri della Società Italiana. Il gruppo di Coppet: C. Pellegrini. La dottrina morale di Coluccio Salutati: L. Borghi.

ARCHIVOS BRASILEIROS DE HIGIENE MENTAL. Organ of the Brazilian League of Mental Hygiene.

Vol. VI. No. 3. July—September, 1933. "Liga de Higiene Mental nao é synonymo de Liga Anti-alcoolica." "A technica da psychoanalyse infantil": Arthur Ramos. Como assistir doentes mentæs agitados: Odilon Gallotti. Os dois primeiros pre-escolares attendidos na Clinica de Euphrenia: Mirandolino Caldas. Higiene mental do lactente: Hosannah de Oliveira. Os inimigos e os amigos do alcool: Ulysses Pernambucano. No. 4. October—December, 1933. A alta tardia dos heredo-psychopathas por motivo de ordem eugenica: Ernani Lopes. A enfermagem dos toxicomanos: Pedro Pernambuco Filho. O alcoolismo na zona rural: Fernando Fonseca. Alcoolatras nos manicomios: Lopes Rodrigues. O alcoolismo latente: Maia Fallace.

ARQUIVOS BRASILEIROS DE NEURIATRIA E PSIQUIATRIA.
Rio de Janeiro.

Vol. XVI. No. 5. September, October, 1933. Poliradiculite ou Polineurite Intra-Craniana pela Recidiva Salvarsanca: A. Austregesilo. Tabes e Psicose: Waldemiro Pires. Astereognosia por Lesao Cortical Parietal Traumatica em Consequencia de Agressao Considerações Medico-Legais: Bourguy de Mendonça. Sobre um caso de Hematoma Sub-Dural: Luiz R. Cavalcante. No. 6. November, December, 1933. Sur une forme anatomo-clinique special de tumeur cerebrale atteignant le genou du corps calleux et les deux lobes frontaux: Georges Guillain. Sobre um caso de paralisia pseudo-hipertrofica: Januario Bittencourt. Esquizofrenia latente e sua importancia medico-legal: Heitor Péres.

ARCHIVOS ARGENTINOS DE PSICOLOGIA NORMAL Y PATOLOGICA,
TERAPIA NEURO MENTAL Y CIENCIAS AFINES. Buenos Aires.

Vol. I. No. 2. September, October, 1933. Examen Médico y Psico-Fisiológico de los Aviadores Militares: Agesilao Milano. El Discriminacionismo afectivo: Waclaw Radecki. Algo sobre Organización e Higiene Mental: Victor Delfino. Nuevo Criterio para la Apreciación Experimental de Edad Mental: Halina Radecka. Selección de los Estudiantes de Medicina: José P. Kafer. Delirios de Magnan sin etapa demencial y otras formas atípicas: René A. Rocha. Selección Psicotécnica de Agentes de Policía: Leopoldo Mata.

REVUE DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE. Parc Léopold, Brussels.

Vol. XIII. No. 3. July—September, 1933. L'art et le machinisme: Jean Lameere. De la garantie des libertés publiques: Henri de Hoon. La prévision dans la science: W.-M. Kozlowski. No. 4. October—December, 1933. XV^e Semaine Sociale Universitaire de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay: Jean Leyder. La prévision dans la science (suite): W.-M. Kozlowski.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW.

Vol. XI. No. 1. September, 1933. The Spanish Constitution of 1931: B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch. Conditional Limitations in Leases in New York: Russell D. Niles. *Stare Decisis*, State Constitutions, and Impairing the Obligations of Contracts by Judicial Decision: Louis B. Boudin. The

Tangle of Contributory Infringement in the Supreme Court: Willis B. Rice. No. 2. December, 1933. Declaratory Judgments in Administrative Law: Edwin M. Borchard. The Legality of State Legislation for Debtors' Relief: Normal J. Small. *Stare Decisis*, etc. (concluded): Louis B. Boudin. No. 3. March, 1934. Classification of Law: Albert Kocourek. A Comparative Study of the Corporation Laws of the States of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and New York: Vincent W. Westrup. The "Vienna School" and International Law: Josef L. Kunz.

THE HUMAN FACTOR. Journal of the Institute of Industrial Psychology. Published Monthly. London: Aldwych House. Price: 2s. 6d. Annual subscription: £1.

Vol. VII. No. 11. November, 1933. A Psychological Approach to Market Research: N. M. Balchin. The Art and Science of Organisation (II): E. G. Hart. The Selection and Training of University Men in a Department Store: F. W. Lawe. Movement Study in Stamping: J. R. Jennings. The Employers' Point of View—IV: Efficiency and Personal Leadership: Christopher A. Lee. The Institute's Clerical Test in America: Herbert Moore. No. 12. December, 1933. Annual Report. Vol. VIII. No. 1. January, 1934. On Wasting Time: N. M. Balchin. Bench Lay-out in an Electrical Repair Shop: L. I. Hunt. The Training of Teachers in Psychological Testing: E. Patricia Hunt and Percival Smith. Market Research in Austria: Hans Zeisl. No. 2. February, 1934. Why and How the Vocational Psychologist Studies Temperament: Alec Rodger. The Practical Value of Physiology to Industry: G. P. Crowden. A Study of Screwdrivers for Small Assembly Work: L. I. Hunt. No. 3. March, 1934. Science and Industry: Julian Huxley. The Measurement of Personality and Temperament: Philip E. Vernon. Some Observations on Inspection for Appearance: J. Willock Seymour. The Worker's Point of View—XVI: The Problem of the Small Shop: W. F. Watson. No. 4. April, 1934. The Industrial Misfit: C. A. Oakley. A Note on Memorability in Advertising: A. M. Lester. The Worker's Point of View—XVII: Whose Job is it?: W. F. Watson. The Human Factor in Industry: H. Dubreuil.

PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Journal of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Honolulu. Price, 25 cents.

Vol. VI. No. 8. November, December, 1933. Pacific Trends: Elizabeth Green. Dr. Inazo Nitobé: James T. Shotwell and others.

Now published Quarterly. Price: 50 cents. Annual subscription: 2 dollars.

Vol. VII. No. 1. March, 1934. The Next War—Europe or Asia?: Arnold J. Toynbee. Mongolia Enters World Affairs: Owen Lattimore. The Economic Crisis and Netherlands-India: J. H. Boeke. Japanese Emigration to Brazil: J. F. Norman. China's Greatest Book: L. Carrington Goodrich.

THE ECONOMIC RECORD. Journal of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. Melbourne University Press. Price: 5s.

Vol. IX. No. 17. December, 1933. The World Economic Conference: E. O. G. Shann. Nationalization of Credit: E. G. Theodore. Saving and Investment in Monetary Theory: E. R. Walker. Progress in Australian Tariff Policy: J. B. Brigden. A Business Index for Australia: E. K. Heath and J. Polglaze. International Comparisons of the time lost through Industrial Disputes: E. J. Riches. Taxable Capacity: L. F. Giblin. The Third Census of the Commonwealth of Australia: H. C. Green. A Study of the Basic Wage in New Zealand Prior to 1928: N. S. Woods. Depression, Unemployment and the Shorter Working Day: F. R. E. Mauldon. Transport Regulation: T. Hytten.

THE AUSTRALIAN INTERCOLLEGIAN. Published Monthly by the Australian Student Christian Movement, 182 Collins Street, Melbourne.

THE MEDICAL JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA. Published Weekly. The Printing House, Seamer Street, Glebe, Sydney. Price: 1s.

NOTES AND NEWS.

ANNUAL CONGRESS.

THE AUSTRALASIAN ASSOCIATION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
with the co-operation of
THE MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY.

The Eleventh Annual General Meeting of the Association was held at the University of Melbourne on May 21, 22, and 23, 1934.

Programme.

First Session—Monday, May 21.

8.15 p.m.—Presidential Address (Public Lecture): “Industrial Psychology”, Acting Professor A. H. Martin, M.A., Ph.D. (Sydney).
Chairman: The Chancellor, Sir John MacFarland, M.A., LL.D.

Second Session—Tuesday, May 22.

10.30 a.m.—“Alexander on Value”, Rev. H. B. Loughnan, S.J. (Melb.).
11.30 a.m.—“The Interest Theory of Value”, Professor A. C. Garnett, M.A., Litt.D. (Butler, U.S.A.).
Chairman: Sir William Mitchell.

Third Session—Tuesday, May 22.

2.30 p.m.—“Contributions from a Worry Clinic”, Acting Professor A. H. Martin, M.A., Ph.D.

3.30 p.m.—“The Problem of Retarded Children”, P. M. Bachelard, Ph.D. (Melbourne).

Chairman: Professor J. A. Gunn.

Fourth Session—Tuesday, May 22.

8 p.m.—“The Place of Minds”, Sir William Mitchell, K.C.M.G. (Adelaide).
Chairman: W. A. Merrylees, M.A., B.Litt.

Fifth Session—Wednesday, May 23.

2.15 p.m.—“Logic and Judicial Procedure”, Professor G. W. Paton, B.A., B.C.L., M.A. (Melbourne).

3.15 p.m.—“The Idea of Class in Social Thought”, F. L. McCay, M.A., LL.B. (Melbourne).

4.15 p.m.—“Religion and the Spirit of Capitalism”, Professor A. G. B. Fisher, M.A., Ph.D. (Otago).

Chairman: Professor A. C. Garnett.

Sixth Session—Wednesday, May 23.

7.45 p.m.—Annual General Meeting—Report and Balance Sheet.

8 p.m.—“The Psychology of Advertising”, G. A. Atkins, M.A., B.Sc. (Melbourne).

9 p.m.—“Is God a Mathematician?” Professor J. A. Gunn, M.A., B.Sc., Ph.D. (Melbourne).

Chairman: Acting Professor A. H. Martin.

Delegates to the Congress paid a visit to Professor Boyce Gibson, who has been seriously ill, and were delighted to find that he is making satisfactory progress.